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(where the two converge) advance requests in the context of MAID. I show how recognition 
of the principle of informed consent has not only served to justify developments in the 
law facilitating advance directives; it has also played an important role in justifying the 
legalization, under specific circumstances, of MAID. The paradigmatic case of informed 
consent is where a clearly competent, fully informed adult effectively communicates with 
their physician, contemporaneously to the administration of treatment. Deviation from these 
conditions raises questions about how to apply the principle. I examine the claim that the 
ascendance of the informed consent principle has eclipsed other principles while obscuring 
the role that the professional judgment of physicians plays in the provision of medical 
treatment. I analyse this claim in relation to conflicts over prolongation of so-called futile 
treatment and access to MAID. I then argue why the capacity requirement, barring advance 
requests for MAID, is justified. 
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IT IS A BASIC REQUIREMENT OF CANADIAN LAW that patients must consent to 
receive medical treatment.1 Tis principle refects the public value placed on the 
protection of personal autonomy and bodily integrity.2 How well application 
of the principle of informed consent approximates these values depends on the 
circumstances.3 An unconscious person (or an individual who has otherwise lost 
their decision-making capacity) will not be able to contemporaneously consent 
to treatment. For this reason, the law permits individuals to prospectively issue 
instructions, appoint a trusted individual to give or refuse medical treatment on 
their behalf, or both.4 Where a person lacks capacity, but has not issued treatment 
directives or named a surrogate in advance, the law may assign a substitute 
1. A health care professional who performs a medical intervention without the patient’s consent 
may be found, in criminal law, guilty of assault, or held civilly liable for battery. See Criminal 
Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 265 [Criminal Code]; Malette v Shulman et al, (1990) 67 DLR 
(4th) 321 (Ont CA) [Malette]. 
2. See Joan Gilmour, “Legal Capacity and Decision-Making” in Joanna Erdman, Vanessa 
Gruben & Erin Nelson, eds, Canadian Health Law and Policy, 5th ed (LexisNexis Canada, 
2017) cited in Council of Canadian Academies, “Te State of Knowledge on Advance 
Requests for Medical Assistance in Dying: Expert Panel Working Group on Advance 
Requests for MAID” (2018), online (pdf ): <cca-reports.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ 
Te-State-of-Knowledge-on-Advance-Requests-for-Medical-Assistance-in-Dying.pdf> at 30 
[CCA, “Advance Requests”]. 
3. See Fleming v Reid, (1991) 82 DLR (4th) 298 (Ont CA) [Fleming]. 
4. Tis article focuses on the legislation in Ontario, which establishes the Health Care Consent 
and Capacity Board (CCB), an independent administrative tribunal that adjudicates conficts 
over patient consent and capacity. Te Ontario legislation shares many general features 
with other Canadian provincial and territorial laws, such as default rules for determining 
a proxy or substitute decision-maker where the patient has not designated one already. See 
Health Care Consent Act, 1996 SO 1996, c 2 Sched A [HCCA]; Healthcare Directives Act, 
CCSM 1993, c H27 [Manitoba]; Te Healthcare Directives and Substitute Healthcare Decision 
Makers Act, 2015, SS 2015, c H-0.002 [Saskatchewan]; Personal Directives Act, RSA 2000, 
c P-6 [Alberta]; Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act, RSBC 1996, c 181 
[British Columbia]; Civil Code of Quebec, SQ 1991, c 64 [Québec]; Consent to Treatment and 
Healthcare Directives Act, RSPEI 1988, c C-17.2 [PEI]; Advance Health Care Directives Act, 
SNB 2016, c 46 [New Brunswick]; Advance Healthcare Directive Act, SNL 1995, c A-4.1 
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decision-maker (SDM).5 However, when medical assistance in dying (MAID) 
was legalized in Canada, patients were not permitted to provide their consent in 
advance. Neither could anybody else consent to MAID on the patient’s behalf. 
Te 2016 MAID law, which modifed the blanket prohibition in the 
Criminal Code on voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide, states that “the 
medical practitioner or nurse practitioner must immediately before providing 
the medical assistance in dying, give the person an opportunity to withdraw 
their request and ensure that the person gives express consent to receive medical 
assistance in dying.”6 While part of the rationale behind the requirement is 
to prevent the possibility of patients receiving MAID against their wishes,7 
an inevitable consequence is that those who want MAID will not be able to get 
it once they lose capacity.8 Te loss of capacity may owe to the progression of an 
[Newfoundland]; Personal Directives Act, SNS 2008, c 8 [Nova Scotia]; Personal Directives Act, 
SNWT 2005, c 16 [Northwest Territories]. 
5. HCCA, supra note 4, ss 9, 20(1); Manitoba, supra note 4, ss 12-15; Saskatchewan, supra
note 4, ss 11-16; Alberta, supra note 4, s 1(a); British Columbia, supra note 4, s 11(b); 
Québéc, supra note 4, s 11; PEI, supra note 4, ss 11, 24(2); New Brunswick, supra note 4, 
s 20; Newfoundland, supra note 4, ss 10-11; Nova Scotia, supra note 4, s 14; Northwest
Territories, supra note 4. 
6. Criminal Code, supra note 1, s 241.2(3)(h). See also Bill C-14, An Act to Amend the Criminal 
Code and to Make Related Amendments to Other Acts (medical assistance in dying), 1st Sess, 
42nd Parl, 2016 (assented to 17 June 2016), SC 2016, c 3 [Bill C-14]. 
7. CCA, “Advance Requests”, supra note 2 at 176. 
8. See Dena S Davis, “Alzheimer Disease and Pre-emptive Suicide” (2014) 40 J Med Ethics 
543 [Davis, “Alzheimer”]. See also Stephen R Latham, “Living Wills and Alzheimer’s 
Disease” (2010) 23 Quinnipiac Prob LJ 425; Dennis R Cooley, “A Kantian Moral Duty 
for the Soon-to-Be Demented to Commit Suicide” (2007) 7 Am J Bioethics 37; Michael 
Wolf, “A Life Worth Ending” New York Magazine (28 May 2012). Cf Rebecca Dresser, 
“Precommitment: A Misguided Strategy for Securing Death with Dignity” (2003) 81 Texas 
L Rev 1823 [Dresser, “Precommitment”]; John A Robertson, “Second Toughts on Living 
Wills” (1991) 21 Hastings Center Rep 6; Sanford H Kadish, “Letting Patients Die: Legal 
and Moral Refections” (1992) 80 Cal L Rev 857; Gilbert Meilaender, “I Want to Burden 
my Loved Ones” First Tings (October 1991) at 25. See also Jocelyn Downie & Georgia 
Lloyd-Smith, “Assisted Dying for Individuals with Dementia: Challenges for Translating 
Ethical Positions into Law” in Michael Cholbi & Jukka Varelius, eds, New Directions in the 
Ethics of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia (Springer, 2015) 97. 





incurable somatic illness (or the medication prescribed to control the resulting 
pain), a neurodegenerative condition, or an irreversible, catastrophic injury.9 
To shed light on the question of Canadian law restricting access to MAID 
through advance request, this article identifes how the principle of informed 
consent has served to justify developments in the law’s facilitation of advance 
directives as well as access to MAID. Part I situates the principle of informed 
consent, then examines the claim that its ascendance has eclipsed the role that the 
professional judgment of physicians plays in the provision of medical treatment. 
Part II considers this claim in relation to conficts over the prolonging of 
so-called futile treatment.10 Te review exposes the potential for confict intrinsic 
to end-of-life decision making for incompetent patients, as well as key features 
of one statutory regime intended to help prevent and resolve such conficts, 
Ontario’s Health Care Consent Act (HCCA).11 Tis framework, including the 
decision-making body it creates, the Health Care Consent and Capacity Board 
(CCB), has its strengths and limitations. Importantly, though, it illustrates the 
value of trying to establish a transparent and legitimate process for making 
decisions about when to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment for 
incompetent patients. 
Part III considers the claim in relation to the controversy surrounding access 
to MAID. Te primacy of informed consent—and the values of protection 
of personal autonomy and bodily integrity that it refects—is thoroughly 
woven through justifcations for complying with advance directives, as well as 
fulflling eligible requests for MAID. But the transition from following clear, 
competent treatment requests or refusals (made in the past) to providing MAID 
9. See Québec, Ministère de la Santé et des Services sociaux, L’aide médicale à mourir pour 
les personnes en situation d’inaptitude : le juste équilibre entre le droit à l’autodétermination, 
la compassion et la prudence, (Report) (Gouvernement du Québec, 29 November 2019) 
at 37, online (pdf ): <publications.msss.gouv.qc.ca/msss/fchiers/2019/19-828-04W.pdf> 
[Québec Report] (noting two other groups of people who may lack capacity to request MAID: 
those who already lack capacity due to an intellectual disability and those whose mental 
health condition renders them either permanently or temporarily incapable of providing 
valid consent). 
10. See Paulina Kyriakopoulos, Mark Fedyk & Michel Shamy, “Translating Futility” (2017) 189 
CMAJ E805 (distinguishing instances where treatment has zero chance of working, such 
as “using orange juice as an anticoagulant” and instances where one is making a judgment 
based on probabilistic, and at the same time, necessarily ethical, reasoning) at E805. See 
also Cheryl Misak, Douglas White & Robert Truog, “Medically Inappropriate or Futile 
Treatment: Deliberation and Justifcation” (2016) 41 J of Med & Phil 90 (discussing how 
views on medically inappropriate or futile treatment can and should relate to medical and 
societal standards, norms and values). 
11. HCCA, supra note 4. 
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to patients lacking legal capacity (in the present) is not seamless. Advance and 
contemporaneous consent are not identical; neither is actively terminating 
a patient’s life versus letting them die. But they are certainly similar. Indeed, 
Canadian jurisprudence makes it clear that in neither case is an absolute 
distinction tenable. My point is that it is impossible to detect when and how 
relevant distinctions arise (either between the two ways to consent or the two 
ways to die), if one is convinced that they are either always the same or always 
diferent, no matter what. 
Part IV explains why the capacity requirement, barring advance requests for 
MAID, is justifed. Entitling this article “the waxing and waning of informed 
consent” is meant to signal that—as illuminating as the principle is when 
grappling with the question of regulating access to MAID through advance 
consent—there is only so much light it can shed. Likewise, there is only so 
much decisional autonomy a person may reasonably expect to project into the 
future on the strength of instructions written in the past. Respecting a person’s 
personal autonomy and bodily integrity requires more ethical imagination and 
decisional fexibility than is reducible to the imposition of a legal duty on a 
MAID provider to follow their patient’s written instructions to terminate their 
life on an appointed date. Te loss of legal capacity does not mean a person’s 
interest in living, and indeed their right to life, diminishes. Tere is a pressing 
public interest in ensuring the law keeps it that way. Te contemporary consent 
requirement constitutes a principled approach to regulating access to medical 
assistance in dying. 
Lastly, Part V underscores the faws in current proposals to change the law. 
If the law is to allow MAID through advance requests, the precise manner in 
which it does so matters enormously. Who has the authority to make life-ending 
decisions for patients when they lose capacity, as well as what rules, duties, and 
principles ought to guide such decisions, are crucial and complex questions. 
If the law is to permit advance requests for MAID without paying careful 
attention to these questions in deliberating over regulatory design, then the 
frequency, intensity, and complexity of the resulting conficts will increase and 
intensify accordingly. Bill C-7, currently before Parliament, is not satisfactory 
in this regard.12 
I. THE PRINCIPLE OF INFORMED CONSENT 
12. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (medical assistance in dying), 2nd Sess, 43rd Parl, 2021 
(third reading 11 March 2021) [Bill C-7]. 













Te principle of informed consent is central to the Canadian law governing 
end-of-life decision-making, since it provides “the primary paradigm for protecting 
the legal rights of patients and guid[es] the ethical practice of medicine.”13 
In efect, consent is “the vehicle that gives legal authority to individual healthcare 
decisions.”14 To be valid, it must be given voluntarily by a person with capacity. 
Having capacity is not a zero sum equation, since the law recognises that those 
“incapable to make decisions regarding certain matters might still have sufcient 
mental capacity to give valid consent to medical treatment.”15 Crucial is “whether 
the patient is able to appreciate adequately the nature of the proposed treatment, 
its anticipated efect and the alternatives.”16 One cannot really consent if one 
does not possess the information necessary to know what it is to which one is 
consenting; thus, physicians have a duty to ensure that the patient’s consent is 
informed.17 Te principle of informed consent requires the patient’s physician to 
disclose the risks involved in the treatment, not just the physician’s assessment 
that the probable benefts outweigh the risks. After all, the patient might reach 
13. Daniel E Hall, Allan V Prochazka & Aaron S Fink, “Informed consent for clinical treatment” 
(2012) 184 CMAJ 533 at 533. 
14. CCA, “Advance Requests”, supra note 2 at 50. 
15. Kenneth Evans, “Consent: A Guide for Canadian Physicians” (2016), online: Canadian 
Medical Protective Association<www.cmpa-acpm.ca/en/advice-publications/handbooks/ 
consent-a-guide-for-canadian-physicians#capacity%20to%20consent>; HCCA, supra note 4, 
s 4(1). Section 4(1) states that: 
[a] person is capable with respect to a treatment, admission to a care facility or a personal 
assistance service if the person is able to understand the information that is relevant to making 
a decision about the treatment, admission or personal assistance service, as the case may be, 
and able to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of decision. 
See also Mental Health Act, RSO 1990, c M7; Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, SO 1992, c 30. 
Tese statutes govern, respectively, “examinations of capacity to manage property upon 
admission to or discharge from a psychiatric facility…” and “Capacity Assessments regarding 
the ability to make decisions regarding property or personal care.” Law Commission of 
Ontario, “Assessing Legal Capacity: Improving Quality and Consistency” (2017), online: 
<www.lco-cdo.org/en/our-current-projects/legal-capacity-decision-making-and-guardianship/ 
fnal-report/5-assessing-legal-capacity-improving-quality-and-consistency>. 
16. Evans, supra note 15. 
17. See Starson v Swayze, 2003 SCC 32. 
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a diferent conclusion about whether the proposed treatment is worth it.18 Te 
choice to give or refuse consent belongs to the patient alone; so long as the patient 
has decision-making capacity and is acting voluntarily, the decision is theirs. 
Tus, respecting the principle of informed consent means recognizing 
patient autonomy and resisting the presumption that “physician knows best.” Te 
requirement stems, however, from deeper, more grave concerns than the mere risk 
of patients feeling patronized by their doctors. Robert Burt traces the roots of the 
concept in U.S. jurisprudence to the Nuremberg Code,19 which declares that “the 
voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential” when conducting 
medical research.20 Te U.S. war tribunal that drafted the code heard evidence 
that Nazi doctors conducted experiments to determine at which level of altitude 
prisoners’ lungs would explode, at what temperature they would freeze to death, 
and how long, left untreated, their burns would take to kill them.21 It may seem 
extraordinary that in the face of such depraved and horrifc crimes, the tribunal 
should respond: “Te basic problem with these experiments is that the subjects 
did not agree to participate.”22 And yet, as Burt explains, the tribunal came to the 
conclusion that absent “the individual subject-patient armed with the principle 
of self-determination”23 no other criteria would ofer an equal defence against 
doctors committing—and legal authorities condoning—such heinous acts in the 
name of science and medicine. 
In this way, the principle of informed consent is a concept born of 
necessity: the need for some normative bulwark against members of the medical 
profession putting their power to destructive use against individual human 
beings. Consequently, Burt argues, the ideal of personal choice, autonomy, and 
self-determination has come to bear the normative weight that the professional 
18. See Reibl v Hughes, [1980] 2 SCR 880 at 895. It is noted that 
[t]o allow expert medical evidence to determine what risks are material and, hence, should be 
disclosed and, correlatively, what risks are not material is to hand over to the medical profession 
the entire question of the scope of the duty of disclosure, including the question whether there 
has been a breach of that duty. 
19. Robert Burt, Death is that Man Taking Names: Intersections of American Medicine, Law, 
and Culture (University of California Press, 2002) at 81. See also “Permissible Medical 
Experiments” in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control 
Council Law No. 10, vol 2 (US Government, 1949) 181 [“Permissible Experiments”]. 
20. “Permissible Experiments”, supra note 19 at 181. 
21. Burt, supra note 19 at 84. 
22. Ibid. 
23. Ibid at 85. 








authority of physicians once did.24 Te informed consent requirement therefore 
functions as a shield. Like any defence mechanism, however, its utility is limited 
and contingent. Too much stress on the question of consent provides the rather 
curious framing of the patient’s experience as primarily one of choice. People may 
choose to see a doctor, but seldom would they choose to get sick. Indeed, when 
it comes to one’s health, the power to choose is intrinsically limited. For example, 
individual decisions intended to hasten death or to prolong life do nothing to 
change the fact that, in the end, death takes everyone. 
Not all patients are equally self-reliant; some patients may require more 
ongoing support and communication from their healthcare providers to ensure 
they are exercising their decision-making autonomy in a meaningful way. Just 
because a patient has said “yes” (or signed a declaration to that efect) upon 
hearing the risks the proposed treatment involves, it does not mean they fully 
understand to what they have agreed.25 If physicians adopt an overly rigid, 
mechanistic approach to respecting an abstract principle, individual patients may 
end up feeling abandoned to their own devices. Tis is one reason why James 
Downar et al stress that “[c]onsent is a process, not an event”;26 moreover, Cathy 
Charles et al go so far as to advocate for a “shared treatment decision-making 
model,” which calls for physicians to take a fexible, dynamic, and interactive 
approach when responding to “individual diferences in patient preferences.”27 
24. Ibid at 83. 
25. See Joseph C Lee, Sara H Torn & Jia Wen Chong, “Patient Consent and Genuine 
Understanding” (2017) 47 Internal Med J 714 at 714 (observing “that resident medical 
ofcers tasked with obtaining patient consents often have a minimal understanding about 
the procedure the patient will be undergoing – and signing consent forms for”); Jürgen JW 
Muslow, T Martin Feeley & Sean Tierney, “Beyond Consent: Improving Understanding 
in Surgical Patients” (2012) 203 Am J Surgery 112 at 113 (noting that clinicians routinely 
presume patient understanding rather than formally assess it); Dena S Davis, “Opportunistic 
Testing: Te Death of Informed Consent?” (2013) 23 Health Matrix 35 at 54 (noting that 
the more routinized the procedure, then the more rushed and pro forma the process for 
obtaining consent, and the less “opportunity for thoughtful informed consent”). 
26. James Downar et al, “Withholding and withdrawing treatment in Canada: Implications of 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in the Rasouli case” (2014) 186 CMAJ E622 at 
E625 [Downar et al, “Rasouli”]. 
27. Cathy Charles, Amiram Gafni & Tim Whelan “Decision-Making in the Physician-Patient 
Encounter: Revisiting the Shared Treatment Decision-Making Model” (1999) 49 Soc Sci & 
Med 651 at 651. Indeed, Carl Schneider writes: “Bioethics has routinely fobbed patients of 
with assurances that they are autonomous and will be guided by their own ‘values.’ Patients 
who want help thinking through their ethical obligations may generally look elsewhere.” Carl 
Schneider “After Autonomy” (2006) 41 Wake Forest L Rev 411 at 442. 
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Te ascendance of the “informed consent” principle risks eclipsing the 
larger context that informs medical decision-making. According the principle 
unqualifed primacy obscures the active and creative role that physicians play 
in interpreting and applying it in practice.28 Consent conditions the manner 
in which a physician provides care; it also refects care for the human being 
receiving treatment. Healthcare professionals exercise their clinical and ethical 
judgment in circumstances subject to material and temporal constraints. Te 
practice of medicine is not reducible to the satisfaction of patient preferences.29 
Patients do not have a right to any treatment they want. Indeed, the ethical 
duties of physicians extend beyond non-interference with patient autonomy. 
Doctors must ofer treatment they consider to be clinically indicated or, in other 
words, medically benefcial.30 Tis does not mean, however, that doctors have 
the legal authority to act unilaterally or that the law reduces all treatment 
decisions to clinical appraisals of medical beneft. On the contrary, conficts over 
28. See Hilary Young, “A Proposal for Access to Treatment Contrary to Clinical Judgment” 
(2017) 11 McGill JL & Health 1 at 39-40, 57 [Young, “Contrary to Clinical Judgment”] 
(arguing in favour of a “role for paternalism in a demand context, notwithstanding 
the fact that in law there is virtually none in the refusal context,” while contending 
that “the law of informed consent should not dictate the outcome of disputes between 
physicians and patients or SDMs about whether certain treatment should be provided”); 
James Downar, Michael Warner & Robert Sibbald, “Mandate to obtain consent for 
withholding nonbenefcial cardiopulmonary resuscitation is misguided” (2016) 188 CMAJ 
245. See also Edmund D Pellegrino, “Patient and Physician Autonomy: Conficting 
Rights and Obligations in the Physician-Patient Relationship” (1994) 10 J Contemp 
Health L & Pol’y 47. 
29. Such a state of afairs would refect a client-based, service industry model of medicine— 
one that displaces the ethos of healing with a culture of “the customer is always right,” 
which, as Young notes, would result in giving capable patients whatever they want, 
“including antibiotics for a viral infection and opiates when they are not in pain.” Young, 
“Contrary to Clinical Judgment”, supra note 28 at 40. See also Edmund D Pellegrino, 
“Te Internal Morality of Clinical Medicine: A Paradigm for the Ethics of the Helping 
and Healing Professions” (2001) 26 J Medicine & Philosophy 559 (discussing the nature 
of the clinical encounter and the kind of relationship that arises between physician 
and patient, thus grounding ethical obligations in a manner that is distinct from, say, 
a commercial transaction). 
30. Cuthbertson v Rasouli 2013 SCC 53 at para 173 [Rasouli] (noting that, “[i]n my view, there is 
no general common law right or entitlement to treatment that a doctor considers medically 
inefective or contrary to the professional standard of care”). 









the withdrawal of treatment from patients who have lost capacity show how 
controversial such matters can be.31 
Indeed, the legal principle of informed consent has made in-roads into certain 
domains of decision-making over which many physicians would have hitherto 
considered themselves sovereign.32 Te Supreme Court of Canada (SCC)’s 2013 
decision in Rasouli,33 that physicians do not possess the authority to unilaterally
withdraw life support from a patient when they believe such a decision is medically 
indicated, established the authority of Ontario’s CCB to settle disagreements over 
health care interventions between SDMs and physicians, which the latter deem 
31. See Hilary Young, “Why Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Treatment Should Not Require 
‘Rasouli Consent’” (2012) 6 McGill JL & Health 54; Joan Gilmour, “Death, Dying 
and Decision-Making About End of Life Care” in Jocelyn Downie, Timothy Caulfeld 
& Colleen M Flood, eds, Canadian Health Law and Policy, 4th ed (LexisNexis, 2011) 
385; Glen Rutland, “Futile or Fruitful: Te Charter and the Decision to Withhold or 
Withdraw Life-Sustaining Treatment” (2009) 17 Health LJ 81; Jocelyn Downie, “Unilateral 
Withholding and Withdrawal of Potentially Life-Sustaining Treatment: A Violation of 
Dignity Under the Law in Canada” (2004) 20 J Palliative Care 143. 
32. See Downar et al, “Rasouli”, supra note 26. See also David Cape et al, “Te Impact of 
the Rasouli Decision: a Survey of Canadian intensivists” (2016) 42 J Medical Ethics 180. 
For example, in 2016, the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario revised their 
end-of-life decision-making policy to require physicians to obtain consent to withhold 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Downar, Warner, and Sibbald criticize the College’s policy 
revision because it efectively mandates doctors to provide CPR in cases where they judge 
it to be medically inappropriate. Downar, Warner & Sibbald, supra note 28. Te College’s 
introduction of the policy followed a recommendation of the Health Professions Appeal and 
Review Board, which found that the College’s disciplinary committee had not adequately 
addressed an allegation of physicians implementing a Do Not Resuscitate Order contrary 
to a substitute decision-maker’s “Full Code” instructions. Te CCB found that the HCCA
governs the decision to withhold life-sustaining treatment, just as the SCC held that it 
governs the decision to withdraw such treatment. EGJW v MGC, 2014 CanLII 49888 (Ont 
HPARB) at para 51 (stating “[i]n the Board’s view, the Court’s remarks apply equally to the 
withholding of treatment and a withdrawal of treatment”). However, the Superior Court of 
Ontario has held, in relation to the medical malpractice suit involving the same parties in 
the disciplinary board decision, that a physician’s decision to no longer ofer a treatment they 
viewed as medically inappropriate is distinguishable from withholding a treatment within a 
patient’s plan of treatment. Were it not, the patient would be “able to pick and choose their 
own treatment.” Wawrzyniak v Livingstone, 2019 ONSC 4900 at paras 223-24. Cf Jocelyn 
Downie, Lindy Willmott & Ben P White, “Next Up: A Proposal for Values Based Law 
Reform on Unilateral Withholding and Withdrawal of Potentially Life Sustaining Treatment” 
(2017) 54 Alta L Rev 803 at 811-12; Chris Kaposy et al, “Te Distinction Between 
Withholding and Withdrawing Treatment in Rasouli: Providing a Solution to an Ethical 
Problem” (2014) 21 Health LJ 29. 
33. Downar et al, “Rasouli”, supra note 26. 
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to have no medical beneft.34 Rasouli involved an SDM (the wife of Mr. Rasouli, 
who had been in a persistent vegetative state for three years) refusing to consent 
to the withdrawal of life support.35 Te patient’s physicians argued inter alia
that consent was not required because, for an intervention to constitute medical 
treatment it had to be medically indicated, and for it to be so indicated, there had 
to be some medical beneft.36 In this case, the doctors maintained there was no 
medical beneft to maintaining life support, so the decision to take Mr. Rasouli 
of life support did not constitute treatment and therefore ought not to require 
his SDM’s consent.37 Te SCC held, however, that evidence of medical beneft 
was not necessary to trigger the principle of informed consent; on the Court’s 
interpretation of the applicable provincial legislation, consent was required for 
any intervention undertaken for a “health-related purpose.”38 Where consent 
could not be obtained, resort had to be made to the CCB, the body created and 
empowered by statute to settle these kinds of disputes.39 
With consent as the vehicle delivering authority to individual health 
decisions, if the patient no longer has the capacity to personally direct the 
process, then their SDM takes control. Te SDM’s decisions are meant to 
embody the patient’s autonomy.40 Te patient’s previously expressed wishes 
exercise considerable force. Notably, there are limits to the decisional power 
SDMs have. Te relationship between informed consent, proxy decision-makers, 
and the patient’s prior expression of treatment wishes will be addressed next in 
the discussion of advance directives. 
34. Prior to Rasouli, the Royal Society of Canada Expert Panel noted the law was unsettled, 
citing cases supporting the authority of physicians to act unilaterally and others casting 
doubt on it. See Udo Schüklenk et al, “End-of-Life Decision-Making in Canada: Te Report 
by the Royal Society of Canada Expert Panel on End-of-Life Decision-Making” (2011) 25 
Bioethics 1 at 24-25. Providing an update on the RSC’s 2011 report, see L Wayne Sumner 
et al, End-of-Life Decision Making: Policy and Statutory Progress (2011-2020) (Royal Society 
of Canada, 2020) at 19 (noting that “much remains legally unsettled with respect to the 
authority of a physician to make a unilateral decision to withhold or withdraw treatment”). 
35. Rasouli, supra note 30. 
36. Ibid. 
37. Ibid. 
38. See HCCA, supra note 4, s 21(1). 
39. See Jocelyn Downie & Michael Hadskis, “In Defence of Consent and Capacity Boards for 
End-of-Life Care” (2014) 61 Can J Anesthesia 899. Cf Robert Sibbald, Paula Chidwick & 
Laura Hawryluck, “Standard of Care and Resource Implications of the Cuthbertson v. Rasouli
Ruling” (2014) 186 CMAJ 327. 
40. CCA, “Advance Requests”, supra note 2. 










II. ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 
Although the paradigmatic case of informed consent is that of a competent 
patient expressing their wishes immediately prior to treatment, cases of patient 
incapacity or unconsciousness make such contemporaneous communication of 
informed consent impossible. To address this problem, advance directives may 
be created which express treatment preferences, designate an SDM in the event 
a person loses decision-making capacity, or both.41 Given the distinct heads of 
power assigned to federal and provincial law-makers, healthcare is primarily in 
the jurisdiction of provinces, but criminal law lies in federal hands.42 Accordingly, 
what constitutes a crime, in the context of end-of-life decision-making, applies 
across the country, but the protocols, processes, and procedures for determining 
consent and capacity in each provincial health care system may vary. In a given 
province, there may be (as one court has described it) “a veritable thicket” 
of interlocking statutes and regulations with implications for advance directives.43 
Notwithstanding these variations, the general principle “that the prior-expressed 
wishes of previously competent adults should be respected when it comes to 
end-of-life decision-making” is refected across all provinces and territories.44 
Across Canada, the law recognises that a competent, informed adult 
patient may refuse medical treatment in advance, even when their physician 
believes that treatment is “clinically indicated” or “medically appropriate.” For 
example, the law recognises that a patient may refuse a blood transfusion even 
if, absent that medical intervention, the patient will die. In Malette v. Shulman,
the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld a decision fnding a physician liable for 
battery because he administered a blood transfusion to an unconscious patient 
in a life-threatening situation even though it had come to his attention that she 
was carrying a card in her purse that stated “No Blood Transfusions…under any 
41. Ibid at 37. Instruction directives (stating treatment preferences) are also known as living wills, 
whereas proxy directives (designating an SDM) are also called durable powers of attorney 
for healthcare. Terms for advance directives vary across Canada (e.g., healthcare directives in 
Manitoba and personal directives in Nova Scotia). See supra note 4 (outlining the various 
legislative schemes addressing advance directives across the country). 
42. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria, c 3 (UK), ss 91-92. See Alana Klein, “Jurisdiction 
in Canadian Health Law” in Joanna N Erdman, Vanessa Gruben & Erin Nelson, eds, 
Canadian Health Law and Policy, 5th ed (LexisNexis Canada, 2017) 29. Provincial power 
over health does not preclude Parliament from legislating on MAID because health is in fact 
“an area of concurrent jurisdiction.” Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5 at para 
53 [Carter SCC]. 
43. See Bentley v Maplewood Seniors Care Society, 2015 BCCA 91 at para 5 [Bentley BCCA]. 
44. See Udo Schüklenk et al, supra note 34 at 23. 
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circumstances,” on the basis of her religious convictions as a Jehovah’s Witness.45 
At trial, the physician noted that he had doubts as to whether the signed but 
undated card provided a sufcient basis to refuse treatment. Unable to confrm 
that the patient’s refusal to consent to treatment was informed or that her refusal 
had not arisen from family or peer pressure, the physician chose not to rely on it. 
Te trial judge found that “Dr. Schulman’s doubt about the validity of the card, 
although honest, was not rationally founded on the evidence before him.”46 Te 
Court of Appeal noted that if the patient could not have issued such a refusal in 
anticipation of such a medical emergency she would have had no way to ensure 
her religious beliefs were respected; thus, the court ruled that “[a] doctor is not 
free to disregard a patient’s advance instructions any more than he would be 
free to disregard instructions given at the time of the emergency.”47 Although 
Canadian common law recognises the right to refuse treatment, even by advance 
directive, it also acknowledges a diference between refusing and demanding 
specifc medical treatment.48 
Furthermore, acute challenges arise when the patient has lost decision-making 
capacity but their prior competent wishes are not evident. Te advance directive 
may not lay out the patient’s preferences very clearly, or the difculty may 
lie in determining whether the wishes as expressed still apply in the present 
circumstances. For example, did the patient change their mind since writing the 
directives? Are the present circumstances what the patient had in mind when 
45. See Malette, supra note 1. Tere is not, however, a right to receive whatever medical 
treatment one demands if that treatment has no medical beneft. See Young, “Contrary 
to Clinical Judgment”, supra note 28; Downie, Willmott, & White, supra note 32 at 826 
(arguing no duty to provide treatment that does not work). 
46. Malette, supra note 1 at 44. But see Norman Siebrasse, “Malette v. Shulman: Te 
Requirement of Consent in Medical Emergencies” (1989) 34 4 McGill LJ 1080 at 1098. 
Siebrasse argues that: 
in a pressing emergency, such as that faced by Dr. Shulman, it seems clearly unreasonable, 
especially in view of the reaction of judges [in a number of cases in the United States] when 
faced with conscious and contemporaneous refusals, to ask a doctor to overcome training and 
instinct to rely on a refusal card, even if it would seem in retrospect to represent the true wishes 
of the patient. 
47. Malette, supra note 1 at 14. But see Siebrasse, supra note 46 at 1095, citing US v George 239 
FS 752 (noting that in US v. George, the patient refusing consent to a blood transfusion 
nevertheless assented to the procedure once the judge had authorized it, indicating that, 
with the court order signed, “his conscience would be clear and he would not resist the 
transfusion in any way”). 
48. See Young, “Contrary to Clinical Judgment”, supra note 28; Downie, Willmott, & White, 
supra note 32 at 826. 











they provided their directives, or were they not anticipating this situation and 
therefore not addressing it in their instructions? 
In Rasouli, where the SCC refused to give an order afrming any common 
law right of physicians to take their patient of life support, there was no relevant 
advance directive from Mr. Rasouli. His SDM’s authority to refuse consent on 
his behalf blocked the physicians from unilaterally withdrawing life-sustaining 
treatment and from acting on their own professional medical judgment. 
As noted, an SDM’s authority is not absolute, however. Te legislation 
provides that if the SDM “knows of a wish applicable to the circumstances that 
the incapable person expressed while capable and after attaining 16 years of age,” 
then the SDM must give efect to that wish.49 Tis applies to any treatment 
including contraindicated treatments.50 If the SDM does not know of any prior 
competent wish (or the wish expressed is impossible to comply with), then “the 
question for the substitute decision-maker is not what the patient would have 
decided in light of the change, but rather what is in the best interests of the 
patient.”51 If the health practitioner who proposed the treatment thinks that the 
SDM did not fulfll their obligations under section 21 of the HCCA, the health 
practitioner may apply to the CCB for a determination to this efect52 and to 
direct the SDM to make the decision that, in the CCB’s view, refects the patient’s 
best interests regarding the proposed treatment.53 
Te HCCA requires the SDM to consider several factors when deciding what 
is in the patient’s best interests.54 First is whether the treatment is likely to: (i) 
improve the incapable person’s condition or well-being; (ii) prevent the incapable 
person’s condition or well-being from deteriorating; or (iii) reduce the extent 
49. HCCA, supra note 4, s 21(1). 
50. Ibid, s 21(1)1; Rasouli, supra note 30 at paras 143-44 (noting “[t]here is no provision that 
gives the Board authority to permit a substitute decision-maker to ignore known wishes and 
to determine and act on the best interests of the patient if the patient, over the age of 16 
years, expressed a clear and applicable wish” at para 148). 
51. HCCA, supra note 4, s 21(1)2; Conway v Jacques, 214 DLR (4th) 67. 
52. HCCA, supra note 4, s 37(1). See Robert W Sibbald & Paula Chidwick, “Best interests at 
end of life: A review of decisions made by the Consent and Capacity Board of Ontario” 
(2010) 25 J Critical Care 171.e1; Paula Chidwick & Robert Sibbald, “Physician Perspectives 
on Legal Processes for Resolving End-of-life Disputes” (2011) 14 Healthcare Q 69; Paula 
Chidwick, Robert Sibbald & Laura Hawryluck, “Best interests at end of life: an updated 
review of decisions made by the Consent and Capacity Board of Ontario” (2013) 28 J 
Critical Care 22; Laura Hawryluck, Robert Sibbald & Paula Chidwick, “Te Standard of 
Care and conficts at the End of Life in critical care: Lessons from medical-legal crossroads 
and the role of a quasi-judicial tribunal in decision-making” (2013) 28 J Critical Care 1055. 
53. HCCA, supra note 4, s 37(3). 
54. Ibid, s 21(2). 
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to which, or the rate at which, the incapable person’s condition or well-being is 
likely to deteriorate. Te second factor is whether the incapable person’s condition 
or well-being is likely to improve, remain the same, or deteriorate without the 
treatment. Tird is whether the beneft that the incapable person is expected to 
obtain from the treatment outweighs the risk of harm to him or her. Finally, the 
SDM is required to consider whether a less restrictive or less intrusive treatment 
would be as benefcial as the treatment that is proposed. 
Te provisions do not explicitly reference death, as the legislation applies 
to all medical treatment scenarios, not just the end-of-life context. Despite the 
general nature of the criteria and the wide variety of situations to which they 
may be applied, the SCC in Rasouli stressed the objective character of the best 
interests question: 
Te substitute decision-maker is not at liberty to ignore any of the factors within the 
best interests analysis, or substitute her own view as to what is in the best interests of 
the patient. She must take an objective view of the matter, having regard to all the 
factors set out, and decide accordingly.55 
In the SCC’s view, the SDM either gets the answer right or not; thus, “[t]he 
Board must apply a standard of correctness in reviewing the decision of the 
substitute decision-maker…[and] consider the matter de novo.”56 Te SCC 
distinguishes, however, between this matter of correctness and “the correctness 
of the physicians’ professional opinion that sustaining life…confers no medical 
beneft.”57 It notes that the CCB must “duly consider the physician’s professional 
opinion and submissions on what would be of medical beneft to the patient,”58 
but the CCB has the authority to reach a decision that efectively compels 
physicians “to continue providing life support, even where they consider it to 
provide no medical beneft to, or even to harm, the patient.”59 
According to Downie, Willmott, and White, what may appear to be a 
drawback to Ontario’s legislative approach actually speaks to one of its chief 
advantages: the law locates “the decision-making power with the patient and 
substitute decision-maker.”60 Tis demands that the doctor and health system 
engage with the SDM, by conveying information, responding to questions, 
55. Rasouli, supra note 30 at para 88. 
56. Ibid at para 99. 
57. Ibid at para 38. 
58. Ibid at para 97. 
59. Ibid at para 71. 
60. Downie, Willmott & White, supra note 32 at 826. 











and maintaining transparency.61 It also underscores one of the HCCA’s most 
important objectives: “to promote communication and understanding between 
health practitioners and their patients or clients.”62 Furthermore, the burden of 
challenging a decision about the provision of treatment ends up falling on those 
in the best position to discharge it: the physician and health care institution, 
rather than the SDM or the patient.63 Lastly, distinguishing the best interests 
standard from the question of medical beneft makes room for “non-clinical 
values, and limits the role of medicine and doctors accordingly.”64 Tat said, the 
authors insist that the right to request treatment contrary to medical beneft is 
not absolute: “Tere are circumstances in which a doctor should not be obliged 
to provide necessaries of life and these should be clearly articulated.”65 Tus, 
in their view, authorization of the CCB “provides a lawful excuse” to health 
care professionals to depart from the requirement of patient or SDM consent; 
nevertheless, Downie, Willmott, and White do not describe how an authoritative 
decision-maker ought to determine when this lawful excuse should be applied.66 
In the 2017 Ontario decision, H.M., Presiding Member Nina Lister noted: 
It is important to underscore a fundamental diference between a capable person 
making treatment decisions on his or her own behalf, and a SDM making decisions 
on behalf of an incapable person…[A] capable person has the right to make foolish 
or selfsh decisions – this is an inviolable attribute of individual liberty and personal 
autonomy protected by our laws…In contrast, a SDM does not have the right 
to make unwise decisions on behalf of an incapable person; a SDM must make 
decisions in accordance with the principles of consent set out in the HCCA…If 
the SDM strays from the HCCA principles, the [CCB] is empowered to intervene 
and compel the SDM to comply with those principles, in accordance with Board’s 
perception of the person’s best interests, as revealed by the evidence.67 
Te SCC’s extensive analysis of the HCCA in Rasouli has understandably 
impacted the way the CCB interprets the Act. Between the Court’s decision 
in 2014 and November 2020, the CCB made seventeen decisions regarding 
whether an SDM complied with the principles outlined in the HCCA when 
refusing a treatment plan that omits all life-saving medical interventions for a 
61. Ibid. 
62. HCCA, supra note 4, s 1(d). 
63. Downie, Willmott & White, supra note 32 at 826. 
64. Ibid at 825-26. 
65. Ibid at 826-27. 
66. Ibid at 827. 
67. 2017 CanLII 34282 (ON CCB) at 28-29 [HM (Re)]. 
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patient with irreversible and advanced neurological damage.68 In six decisions, 
the CCB ruled that the patient’s physician was not able to prove, on a balance 
of probabilities, that the SDM’s refusal to consent to the physician’s treatment 
proposal—to provide palliative care but abstain from life-sustaining medical 
interventions—contravened the legislative requirements.69 In these cases, the 
CCB agreed with the SDM that it was in the patient’s best interests to continue 
life-sustaining treatment, even though the physician contended that it would be 
of no medical beneft. Only one of the six cases involved an elderly person—in 
that case, a retired 86 year-old professor of medicine whom the CCB concluded 
had clearly expressed a competent wish to be resuscitated.70 Te other decisions 
involved an infant,71 a 6 year-old,72 a middle-aged father,73 a young man in his 
20s,74 and a 36 year-old man with strong religious views.75 In each case, the 
SDM’s evidence, expectations, and perceptions conficted with those of the 
medical team, contributing to the CCB’s determination that the SDM had 
complied with the Act. In the eleven other cases, where the CCB ordered the 
68. CN (Re), 2014 CanLII 53714 (ON CCB); SS (Re), 2015 CanLII 44140 (ON CCB); 
SL (Re), 2016 CanLII 46386 (ON CCB); PS (Re), 2017 CanLII 34288 (ON CCB); JEP 
(Re), 2017 CanLII 49299 (ON CCB); NS (Re), 2017 CanLII 141943 (ON CCB); LL (Re), 
2017 CanLII 70035 (ON CCB); HM (Re), supra note 67; AH (Re), 2018 CanLII 119741 
(ON CCB); AC (Re), 2018 CanLII 57652 (ON CCB); GL (Re), 2018 CanLII 132242 (ON 
CCB); MO (Re), 2019 CanLII 110013 (ON CCB); VB (Re), 2019 CanLII 47034 (ON 
CCB); HC (Re), 2019 CanLII 47097 (ON CCB); SH (Re), 2019 CanLII 79248 (ON CCB); 
NA (Re), 2019 CanLII 129081 (ON CCB); AW (Re), 2020 CanLII 32608 (ON CCB). 
69. CN (Re), supra note 68; SS (Re), supra note 68; PS (Re), supra note 68; JEP (Re), supra note 
68; NS (Re), supra note 68; MO (Re), supra note 68. 
70. JEP (Re), supra note 68. 
71. CN (Re), supra note 68. 
72. SS (Re), supra note 68. 
73. PS (Re), supra note 68. 
74. NS (Re), supra note 68. 
75. MO (Re), supra note 68. 












SDM to consent to the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment, 
the average age of the patients was considerably higher.76 
In 2014, James Downar et al noted that “in the two years since the Rasouli 
decision…[the CCB] has been consulted for only three end-of-life cases, 
compared with 24 cases in the four years before the decision.”77 Although there 
was a precipitous drop in cases immediately following Rasouli, the numbers 
have increased consistently. Further empirical research would be necessary to 
verify Downar et al’s conclusion that “[t]he Rasouli decision did not lead to 
more confict resolution; it led to confict avoidance and the provision of more 
aggressive life-sustaining therapy, even in cases to which the decision did not 
apply.”78 More modestly, Rasouli may be interpreted as merely recognizing the 
CCB’s jurisdiction to hear end-of-life cases involving demands for treatment 
with no medical beneft. Since that SCC decision, however, the CCB has been 
interpreting the law diferently. Te contrast is evident in CCB Vice Chair Michael 
Newman’s decision in JR (Re)—made prior to the SCC ruling in Rasouli—and 
his subsequent decisions, which quote Rasouli extensively. 
Tus, in the pre-Rasouli decision of JR (Re), Vice Chair Newman notes 
that according to the Act, “only health practitioners…could propose Treatment, 
although patients or their substitute decision makers could suggest or request 
76. One of the eleven decisions does not state the patient’s age (although based on the 
information it may be inferred that they are a senior). See AC (Re), supra note 68. Te 
average age of the other ten patients is 73.5 years. See AH (Re), supra note 68 at 22 
(involving a 90-year-old woman whose son insisted on full code, stating “I will not change 
my plan under any circumstances & this is the wish of my mother”); HM (Re), supra note 
67 (involving an 81-year-old man); LL (Re), supra note 68 (involving an 88-year-old man); 
SL (Re), supra note 68 (involving a 92-year-old man); GL (Re), supra note 68 (involving a 
70-year-old woman); VB (Re), supra note 68 (involving a 71-year-old woman); HC (Re), 
supra note 68 (involving a 62-year-old woman) ; SH (Re), supra note 68 (involving a 
75-year-old woman); NA (Re), supra note 68 (involving a 56-year-old man); AW (Re), supra
note 68 (involving a 50-year-old man). In all seventeen cases, the medical evidence was that 
the patient was never going to recover. In every case, also, one may detect a breakdown in 
communication and trust. One defensible reading of the diference between those decisions 
supporting the SDM and those that do not is that the reason for the communication 
breakdown and distrust did not owe to the actions of the SDM alone. Unsurprisingly, where 
the CCB found in the SDM’s favour, the actions and perspective of the SDM are portrayed 
more sympathetically than in decisions that came down the other way. 
77. Downar, Warner & Sibbald, supra note 28 at 246. 
78. Ibid. But see Rasouli, supra note 30; Laura Hawryluck et al, “Te Perils of Medico-legal 
Advocacy in ICU Conficts at the End of Life: A Qualitative Study of What Happens When 
Advocacy and Best Interests Collide” (2019) 51 J Critical Care 149. 
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treatments.”79 In fact, Newman relies on the reasoning of the Ontario Court of 
Appeal in its decision in Rasouli, which the SCC would later end up rejecting: 
[W]e have difculty accepting that the legislature intended to include within the 
defnition of treatment measures that attending physicians consider to be of no 
medical value and therefore worthless. More to the point, if the legislature intended 
that consent was required to the withholding or withdrawal of life support measures 
that are considered to be medically inefective or inappropriate, we would have 
expected clearer language to that efect.80 
Furthermore, depending on the case at hand, as well as the composition of the 
CCB that hears it, the analysis and outcome of the CCB’s decision may vary. For 
example, Vice Chair Newman concluded in NS that a mother’s insistence on 
“full code” for her son was in his best interests, notwithstanding the consensus 
medical opinion that the patient would remain in a vegetative state and should 
therefore be allowed to die if he were to go into cardiac arrest. 81 Te decision 
of the CCB reads: 
NS was a fghter. His mother knew that. We all know that about him. In his time in 
hospital he has demonstrated that. He has been fghting back, no longer requiring 
life support. In spite of the predictions of medicine NS has continued to fght back.82 
Evidence that NS’s doctors had made other predictions that never came true 
infuenced the CCB’s analysis in this respect. At the same time, the decision 
ofers no scientifc basis for equating survival in a persistent vegetative state with 
a person’s level of will-power and yet the perception of the patient as a “fghter” 
ends up being decisive, outweighing the clinical judgment that prolonging 
the patient’s death would be medically futile. By contrast, in another 2017 
post-Rasouli decision (that of HM (Re)) the CCB, constituted diferently, states: 
I felt that [the SDMs’] faith in HM’s potential recovery was akin to a fantasy, which 
distorted their rational consideration of HM’s best interests. Teir unrealistic faith 
in HM’s potential recovery led [the SDMs] to dismiss the medical evidence that 
contradicted their fantasy, and also blinded them to HM’s current sufering. Teir 
79. 2013 CarswellOnt 10236 at 14-15 (Ont CCB). 
80. Ibid at 16, citing Rasouli v Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre, 2011 ONCA 482 at para 41. 
In support of the Court of Appeal for Ontario’s view, see Robert Sibbald, Paula Chidwick & 
Laura Hawryluck, “Standard of care and resource implications of the Cuthbertson v. Rasouli 
ruling” (2014) 186 CMAJ 327 at 328 (arguing that “if the professional judgment of a group 
of physicians is that a treatment lies outside the standard of care…the board should have no 
role in questioning that judgment”). 
81. HM (Re), supra note 67. 
82. Ibid at 36. 









approach was to justify HM’s current sufering because he might eventually wake 
up and enjoy life once again.83 
Such diferences in the CCB’s language and approach refect the margin for 
maneuver and no doubt wrenching difculty each presiding Board member 
must encounter in these kinds of cases. Te meaning of a patient’s best interests 
may be blurry, only coming into focus in the eye of the beholder. JEP, another 
2017 decision by Newman, nevertheless illustrates just how sharply the clinical 
position and the requested treatment may contrast.84 Dr. D’Egidio, the patient’s 
physician, testifed before the CCB that even though the patient’s SDMs 
recognised that their 86 year-old father was dying, “they were insisting on Full 
Code status because they were respecting JEP’s wishes, values, and beliefs.”85 In the 
doctor’s view, however, those wishes “were now impossible to respect because 
they violated physician ethical principles” and following them would only cause 
the patient harm.86 Despite Dr. D’Egidio’s view that providing CPR and dialysis 
would be medically futile and “ethically at odds with his physician’s oath to do 
no harm,” the CCB concluded that the SDMs were acting in accordance with the 
principles for substitute decision making set out in the HCCA.87 
Even though, generally speaking, a patient’s specifc advance instructions take 
precedence, an SDM may nonetheless have to interpret them. Te instructions 
themselves, and the circumstances in which they must be applied, can pose 
difculties, giving rise to conficting interpretations. For example, in the 2014 
British Columbia case of Bentley v. Maplewood Seniors Care Society, the family 
of Margot Bentley, an 83-year-old Alzheimer’s patient, sought a declaration 
requiring the seniors’ home to stop giving her food and water.88 Te judge ruled 
that providing the patient with food and water (as opposed to artifcial nutrition 
and hydration) constituted “personal” rather than “medical” care. Refusal to 
be given food or drink could not therefore fall within a set of valid healthcare 
directives. Moreover, because the patient had issued two sets of instructions at 
diferent times which were inconsistent, the judge deemed them inconclusive. 
Ultimately, the judge found that Margot Bentley’s receptivity to eating and 
drinking demonstrated her present wishes, and that as a matter of common law, 
83. Ibid at 40. 
84. JEP (Re), supra note 68. 
85. Ibid at 28. 
86. Ibid. 
87. Ibid at 28-29, 38. 
88. 2014 BCSC 165 [Bentley BCSC]. 
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one’s current competent wishes, expressed through one’s conduct, trump advance 
directives as well as SDM authority.89 
Margot Bentley was in a long-term care facility in the fnal stage of Alzheimer’s. 
Having lost all speech and basic psychomotor skills, her brain appeared “to no 
longer be able to tell the body what to do.”90 Years prior to her diagnosis, Margot 
Bentley had signed a “statement of wishes” asking that she be allowed to die 
should she end up sufering from an extreme disability with no expectation of 
recovery, and that she not be provided with nourishment or liquids. She had, 
however, authored a subsequent document stating she did not want to be kept 
alive “by artifcial means such as life support systems, tube feeding, antibiotics, 
resuscitation or blood transfusions” and that “any treatment which has no 
beneft other than a mere prolongation of [her] existence” should be withheld 
or withdrawn.91 Because of this discrepancy, the judge did not conclude that the 
patient had given advance consent to be deprived of food and water once she 
reached an advanced stage of her illness. Meanwhile, although Margot Bentley 
was no longer capable of eating independently, the staf at the facility would 
hold food and water up to her mouth which she would eat and drink. Te judge 
ruled that by accepting the oral nutrition and hydration, Bentley was providing 
her consent.92 Te Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision, noting that 
“a court of law will be assiduous in seeking to ascertain and give efect to the 
wishes of the patient in the ‘here and now,’ even in the face of prior directives, 
whether clear or not.”93 In reaching this conclusion, the BC Court of Appeal 
cited the SCC’s decision in Carter v. Canada, “where the Court emphasized that 
when assisted suicide is legalized, it must be conditional on the ‘clear consent’ of 
the patient.” 94 
According to Jocelyn Downie, since the BC Court of Appeal accepted the trial 
judge’s fnding that Margot Bentley was making a presently competent decision, 
Bentley “was not, in the end, a case of a presently incompetent vs. previously 
89. Ibid at paras 59-60. See HCCA, supra note 4, s 5(3) (in Ontario, “[l]ater wishes expressed 
while capable prevail over earlier wishes”). 
90. Bentley BCSC, supra note 88 at para 23. 
91. Ibid at para 9. 
92. Ibid at para 153. 
93. Bentley BCCA, supra note 43 at para 18. Similarly, the Regional Disciplinary Tribunal in Te 
Hague has noted that a written advance euthanasia directive “must be extremely clear,” and, 
“at the time of the euthanasia procedure, no matter how advanced the patient’s dementia, 
their views and their reaction to the situation must be considered.” See CCA, “Advance 
Requests”, supra note 2 at 74. 
94. Bentley BCCA, supra note 43 at para 18, citing Carter SCC, supra note 42 at para 127. 






competent person.”95 Tus, in Downie’s view, the common law principle that a 
patient’s previously expressed capable wishes trump the preferences they express 
in their current, incompetent state, persists. Terefore, “health care providers 
have a legal obligation to respect a previously competent person’s prior capable 
informed expressed wishes not to be ofered or given oral or artifcial nutrition or 
hydration after losing capacity.”96 Furthermore, based on her interpretation of the 
corresponding statutory scheme in Nova Scotia, Downie argues that even where 
an incompetent patient asks for food or water, “the substitute decision-maker 
must…refuse consent to artifcial nutrition or hydration in accordance with that 
person’s prior capable wishes; further, the health care providers must respect that 
refusal.”97 Under Downie’s account of the common law, and accommodation 
of the BC Court of Appeal’s decision in Bentley within it, whether a patient is 
deemed to have capacity for the purpose of receiving oral nutrition and hydration 
will determine whether their SDM has a right—and in efect, a duty—to deny 
them food and water in accordance with their previously expressed, capable 
wishes. Based on the decision in Bentley, however, an advance directive will not 
justify denying food and water to a conscious person still willing to eat and drink. 
Notwithstanding arguments as to whether a person at such an advanced phase 
of cognitive deterioration is aptly characterized as capable of willing anything, 
it appears that in Canadian law, a patient’s prior instructions do not nullify the 
duties their caregivers owe to them or override the patient’s current expression 
of preferences. 
Tus, the proposition that, at law, a previously competent wish always 
supersedes a current incompetent wish, has limited determinative value in 
situations, including this case, involving voluntarily stopping eating and drinking, 
where the expression of a preference constitutes a current, competent wish. For 
example, a willingness to eat and drink is all that needs to be demonstrated to show 
that the patient is competent in respect to these activities. Capacity assessment 
is always context and task specifc.98 People do not forfeit their experiential 
interests or the right to pursue them simply because they have been determined 
to have lost legal capacity. Just because one is incompetent to make decisions 
about life-sustaining medical treatment or lacks the legal capacity to request 
95. Jocelyn Downie, “An Alternative to Medical Assistance in Dying? Te Legal Status of 
Voluntary Stopping Eating and Drinking (VSED)” (2018) 1 Can J Bioeth 48 at 50. 
96. Ibid at 52. 
97. Ibid. 
98. See Ellen Wiebe et al, “Assessment of capacity to give informed consent for Medical 
Assistance in Dying (MAiD): A qualitative study of clinicians’ experience” (2021) CMAJ 
Open [forthcoming]. 
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medical assistance in dying does not mean that one is no longer competent to 
decide whether to eat and drink. Of course, the problem arises in respect of 
what constitutes ofering food and drink (the only way to facilitate the otherwise 
incompetent person to do the thing they want to do in the present moment) and 
force-feeding, which frustrates the patient’s expression of autonomy.99 
Evidently, when patients consent in advance rather than immediately before 
treatment, questions are more likely to arise “as to the clarity or currency of the 
wishes, their applicability to the patient’s present circumstances, and whether 
they have been revoked or revised by subsequent wishes or a subsequently 
accepted treatment program.”100 In other words, the less ambiguous one’s advance 
instructions are, the more regularly one re-iterated them, and the less time one 
had to alter them, the more they merit respect. 
III. IMPORTANCE OF INFORMED CONSENT IN JUSTIFYING 
ACCESS TO MAID 
Informed consent has played an important role in justifying MAID. First, the 
value of autonomy represented by the consent principle is a crucial element in 
the argument for legalizing MAID; furthermore, informed consent is presented 
as a safeguard against mistake and abuse in the regulation of this “end-of-life 
practice.”101 Until 2015 and the SCC’s decision in Carter, there was an important, 
bright-line distinction in Canadian law between consent to the withholding 
and withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment (i.e., “passive” MAID), 
and consent to physician-assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia (i.e., “active” 
MAID.) Evidence disputing the ethical salience of the active/passive distinction 
99. See Taddeus Mason Pope & Lindsey E Anderson, “Voluntarily Stopping Eating and 
Drinking: A Legal Treatment Option at the End of Life” (2011) 17 Widener L Rev 363 
at 406-07 (observing in U.S. case law that, how a caregiver ofers food to a patient who 
is voluntarily stopping eating and drinking, may afect whether the conduct constitutes 
battery); Paul T Menzel & M Colette Chandler-Cramer, “Advance Directives, Dementia, 
and Withholding Food and Water by Mouth” (2014) 44 Hastings Center Report 23 at 25 
(arguing in favour of withholding oral nutrition and hydration to incompetent patients who 
have made an advance directive to that efect only once the dementia has become severe and 
problems with eating and drinking have already arisen). 
100. Fleming, supra note 3 at 318. 
101. Tis is the Court’s characterization. See Carter SCC, supra note 42 at para 127 (requiring 
evidence the patient “clearly consents to the termination of life”). See Bentley BCCA, supra
note 43. For relevant statutory provisions, see Criminal Code, supra note 1, s 241.2(1) 
(e), 241.2(3)(h). 










contributed to the SCC’s invalidation of laws criminalizing active MAID under 
certain circumstances.102 Te SCC ruled that these laws are void 
insofar as they prohibit physician-assisted death for a competent adult person who 
(1) clearly consents to the termination of life; and (2) has a grievous and irremediable 
medical condition (including an illness, disease or disability) that causes enduring 
sufering that is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances of his or her 
condition.103 
One of the government’s arguments supporting the blanket ban on voluntary 
euthanasia and assisted suicide was the difculty of developing adequate 
safeguards to protect vulnerable individuals from being induced to choose an 
assisted death. In its judgment, the SCC observed that there already are safeguards 
in place when it comes to “end-of-life medical decision-making in Canada.”104 
Te Court stated: 
[T]here is no reason to think that the injured, ill and disabled who have the option 
to refuse or to request withdrawal of lifesaving or life-sustaining treatment, or who 
seek palliative sedation, are less vulnerable or less susceptible to biased decision-
making than those who might seek more active assistance in dying. Te risks that 
Canada describes are already part and parcel of our medical system.105 
In an important respect, therefore, the judicial contribution to legalization of 
active MAID in Canada was justifed as an extension of the principles governing 
passive MAID. If respect for patient autonomy in medical decision-making 
means recognizing the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, patients sufering 
intolerably should be able to request assistance in dying. By logical extension— 
one might argue—since a person may instruct their SDM to refuse consent to 
life-sustaining interventions on their behalf, they should also be able to issue an 
advance directive for MAID. 
In contrast, when Parliament passed Bill C-14, it modifed aspects of 
the SCC’s remedial declaration in Carter, notably by defning “grievous and 
irremediable condition” (the SCC’s language) to include the requirement that 
a patient be in “an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability” and their 
102. Carter SCC, supra note 42 at para 23; Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2012 
BCSC 866 at para 357 [Carter BCSC]. See also John Keown, “A Right to Voluntary 
Euthanasia--Confusion in Canada in Carter” (2014) 28 Notre Dame JL Ethics & 
Pub Pol’y 1 at 23; L W Sumner, Assisted Death: A Study in Ethics and Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
103. See Carter SCC, supra note 42 at para 127. 
104. Ibid at para 115. 
105. Ibid. 
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“natural death has become reasonably foreseeable.”106 Julia Lamb and the BC 
Civil Liberties Association brought a Charter challenge against both eligibility 
criteria in British Columbia, whereas Jean Truchon and Nicole Gladu challenged 
the “natural death has become reasonably foreseeable” criterion and the provincial 
“end-of-life” requirement in Québec.107 In its response to the statement of claim 
in B.C.’s Lamb case, the government argued that: 
[t]he purpose of the legislation is to allow those who are in decline and whose 
natural death has become reasonably foreseeable the choice of a medically assisted 
death. It does not provide a general right to medically assisted death as a response to 
sufering in life. Nor does anything in the Carter decision provide for such a right.108 
Indeed, while recognizing “the autonomy of persons who have a grievous and 
irremediable medical condition that causes them enduring and intolerable 
sufering and who wish to seek medical assistance in dying,” the Preamble to 
the law afrms “the inherent and equal value of every person’s life” while 
denouncing “negative perceptions of the quality of life of persons who are elderly, 
ill or disabled.”109 Tus, the legislative dimension of Canadian law reform on 
MAID, efected in 2016, places more emphasis on the ways in which voluntary 
euthanasia and assisted suicide difer from existing end-of-life medical practices 
than the SCC did in its reasoning in Carter. In that decision, the Court decried 
the “cruel choice” that the blanket prohibition on lawful physician-assisted dying 
was imposing on Gloria Taylor, and those like her, “between killing herself while 
she was still physically capable of doing so, or giving up the ability to exercise 
106. Criminal Code, supra note 1, ss 241.2(2)(b), 241.2(2)(d). 
107. Truchon c Procureur général du Canada, 2019 QCCS 3792 [Truchon] (where the Quebec 
Superior Court declared both the federal “natural death has become reasonably foreseeable” 
and the provincial “end of life” requirements unconstitutional). See Kelly Grant, “B.C. 
woman drops challenge of MAID law after learning she qualifes for assisted dying” Te 
Globe and Mail (18 September 2019), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/ 
article-bc-woman-challenging-reasonably-foreseeable-clause-in-maid-law> (reporting 
on how evidence from the federal government’s medical expert on the plaintif’s MAID 
eligibility resulted in Lamb v. Canada not proceeding to trial). See Lamb v Canada, (Attorney 
General), 2017 BCSC 1802 [Lamb]. See also Tomas McMorrow, “MAID in Canada? 
Debating the Constitutionality of Canada’s New Medical Assistance in Dying Law” (2018) 
44 Queen’s LJ 69. For a discussion of the constitutionality of MAID law in Canada from 
competing perspectives, see Hamish Stewart, “Constitutional Aspects of Canada’s New 
Medically-Assisted Dying Law” (2018) 85 SCLR (2d) 435; Trudo Lemmens, “Charter 
Scrutiny of Canada’s Medical Assistance in Dying Law and the Shifting Landscape of Belgian 
and Dutch Euthanasia Practice” (2018) 85 SCLR (2d) 459. 
108. Lamb, supra note 107 (Response to Civil Claim at part 3, para 9), online (pdf ): <bccla.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2016/08/2016-07-27-Response-to-Civil-Claim.pdf>. 
109. Bill C-14, supra note 6. 











any control over the manner and timing of her death.”110 Although Parliament 
amended the Criminal Code to lift the blanket ban, the law continues to impede 
people from exercising control over the manner and timing of their death through 
medical assistance. 
Te “grievous and irremediable medical condition” standard provides a 
legal criterion for distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate forms of 
medically assisted death. Limiting access in this way is meant to help prevent 
error and abuse: to stop MAID being inficted on people absent their “true 
consent.”111 It may also refect the SCC’s reluctance to view MAID as totally 
interchangeable with other end-of-life healthcare decision-making practices. 
Along with “the autonomy and dignity of a competent adult who seeks death 
as a response to a grievous and irremediable medical condition,” the SCC in 
Carter did acknowledge the important, competing values of “the sanctity of life 
and the need to protect the vulnerable.”112 It made no pronouncement as to the 
constitutionality of permitting incompetent patients to receive MAID through 
advance directives.113 
Nevertheless, the question of whether inficting death on someone is 
intrinsically wrong—and rightfully prohibited under criminal law—(whether that 
person has voluntarily consented to be killed or not) received cursory attention 
from the SCC’s per curiam judgment in Carter. Te Court’s reasoning suggests that 
when a person is sufering intolerably from a grievous and irremediable medical 
condition, it is wrong to take their life insofar as doing so infringes upon that 
person’s individual autonomy. In other words, what is morally wrong in killing 
another human being is reducible to violating the principle of informed consent 
in medical decision-making. If protecting individual autonomy is the only point 
of prohibiting killing, then no competent person who clearly consents to the 
termination of life should be constrained by the criminal law from exercising 
their autonomy in this way. Why should the criminal law constrain anyone from 
receiving assistance in ending their life? Te SCC in Carter does not address 
this question at the same time as it abstains from recognizing the right of every 
person to receive physician assistance “to bring a peaceful end to their lives at a 
time and in a manner of their own choosing.” 114 Rather, it stipulates competency, 
110. Carter SCC, supra note 42 at 13. 
111. Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General) [1993] 3 SCR 519 at para 621 [Rodriguez]. 
112. Carter SCC, supra note 42 at para 2. 
113. Ibid at para 127. 
114. Ibid at para 14. 
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voluntariness, adulthood, intolerable sufering, and a grievous and irremediable 
medical condition as prerequisites. 
Te collection of opinions in the split SCC decision in Rodriguez v. British 
Columbia (Attorney General), rendered twenty two years before Carter, displays 
a greater range of tensions in reasoning.115 For example, writing for the majority, 
Justice Sopinka argued that the blanket ban refected the “consensus…that 
human life must be respected and we must be careful not to undermine the 
institutions that protect it.”116 Meanwhile, dissenting, Justice McLachlin (as she 
then was) disputed this assertion of a consensus, arguing that the criminal law 
does not contain an absolute prohibition on killing and should not proscribe 
assistance of suicide when suicide itself is already legal.117 
In Justice McLachlin’s view, permitting MAID was about respecting 
individual choice. Prohibiting MAID frustrates how certain individuals wish 
to exercise their autonomy. Conversely, for Justice Sopinka, the problem with 
permitting MAID lay in the risk that doing so would not only satisfy but in fact 
spur demand. Whereas Justice McLachlin regards the criminal law as wanting 
when it comes to facilitating individual choice, Justice Sopinka sees it as needing 
to ofer the right guide to autonomous decision-making. Justice Sopinka expressed 
worry that legally authorizing medical assistance in dying “would send a signal 
that there are circumstances in which the state approves of suicide.”118 According 
to him, by “upholding the respect for life, [the prohibition] may discourage those 
who consider that life is unbearable at a particular moment, or who perceive 
themselves to be a burden upon others, from committing suicide.”119 
Counsel for the plaintifs in Carter succeeded in persuading the trial judge, 
however, that the singularity and power of this message could not be taken for 
granted. Justice Lynn wrote: 
I accept that suicide and attempts at suicide are serious public health problems 
that governments are trying to address. To that end, the absolute prohibition may 
have some of the salutary efects the defendants allege, for example, sending an 
anti-suicide message and a message about the value of every life, including the lives 
of those who are elderly or disabled. Nevertheless, I note that by thwarting the 
wishes of persons who are physically disabled, grievously ill and sufering intractably, 
the law sends a negative message that their wishes, and their sufering, are not as 
important as are other considerations. Te law’s positive general message about the 
115. Rodriguez, supra note 111. 
116. Ibid at 608. 
117. Ibid at 620-21. 
118. Ibid at 608. 
119. Ibid. 








value of human life must be weighed against its negative message specifc to the 
people whom it most directly afects.120 
In both the SCC’s judgment in Carter, and the amendment to the Criminal 
Code, physical disability rendering one incapable of independently ending one’s 
own life is not an eligibility requirement for MAID. Although the Court refers to 
a person physically unable to terminate their life at the moment of their choosing 
while elaborating its reasoning behind invalidating the blanket ban121, neither 
the SCC nor Parliament proposed limiting MAID eligibility to patients in these 
kinds of circumstances alone. Nonetheless, Parliament’s access regime under 
C-14 for MAID presents a skeptical posture towards the claim that assistance in 
dying is actually the help that each person needs when they ask for it. It refects 
a concern that in making MAID legal, it reduces roadblocks deterring people 
from executing their current, but potentially temporary, wish to die. Making 
MAID available may afect whether and how people with illnesses, diseases, and 
disabilities view the choice to die as an alternative to their sufering. 
Indeed, Trudo Lemmens argues: 
Normalization of a practice can create subtle pressures when it becomes seen as 
the standard procedure in specifc situations. It may increasingly be seen as the 
norm, and thus people may indirectly come to expect those who are elderly or 
dependent on others to opt for euthanasia…A key concern is the efectiveness of 
measures to protect those who may otherwise have preferred to live longer; those 
who, perhaps, may not have had a stable and authentic desire to end their lives 
(which is itself of course very difcult to determine); those who may have felt under 
pressure in the circumstances of their illness or disability, and in specifc socio-
economic circumstances, to opt for earlier termination of life; and those who may 
be vulnerable because of mental illness.122 
120. Carter BCSC, supra note 102 at paras 1265-66. 
121. Carter SCC, supra note 42 at para 126. Te Court’s remedial declaration contains the phrase: 
“To the extent that the impugned laws deny the s. 7 rights of people like Ms. Taylor.” It also 
concludes with the following sentences: “Te scope of this declaration is intended to respond 
to the factual circumstances in this case. We make no pronouncement on other situations 
where physician-assisted dying may be sought.” Carter SCC, supra note 42 at para 127. 
Canada did not persuade the court in Truchon, however, that these statements constrict the 
efect of the Court’s remedial declaration. “Si la Cour suprême voulait établir ou imposer un 
lien temporel entre l’administration de l’aide médicale à mourir et l’imminence de la mort, 
elle l’aurait certainement écrit de manière précise dans les considérants de son jugement 
alors qu’elle prend soin d’élaborer les conditions qui y donne ouverture.” Truchon, supra note 
107 at para 495. 
122. Lemmens, supra note 107 at 480-81. 
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Being able to end one’s life immediately, painlessly, confdently, lawfully, with 
friends and family present, and with a doctor or nurse practitioner’s assistance, 
may render the decision to terminate one’s life at a time of one’s choosing more 
attractive and legitimate. In this sense, the critique at issue does not concern 
outright coercion, unconscious bias, or deliberate manipulation. Each of these is 
doubtless a concern in its own right and why the law requires MAID assessors to 
verify that the patient’s request is voluntary.123 Rather, here the point is that the 
law creates room for an interior sense of obligation to develop, according to which 
one feels one ought to spare others (or oneself ) the burden of one’s being. Te 
more MAID is perceived as the way for a person with a deteriorating cognitive 
condition to die with dignity, the more dying naturally in such circumstances 
appears as the undignifed, inconsiderate, even selfsh thing to do. 
Of course, having MAID as an option is not going to have the same impact 
on the way everyone perceives and experiences their end-of-life choices. Still 
some people may want to be saved the choice that others ardently wish to make. 
Tis tension is also present when it comes to the matter of advance requests for 
MAID. Welcome relief from barriers to access may also import an unwelcome 
burden to justify why one is not choosing MAID. What further complicates and 
therefore distinguishes the advance request scenario is the expanded role of those 
acting on patients’ behalf. In voluntary euthanasia, the patient does not execute 
their decision on their own. Te MAID provider acts as their agent. When 
provision does not immediately follow the patient’s communication of informed 
consent, the agent must decide where, when, why, and how to give efect in the 
present to a request that a no longer competent individual made in the past. 
To prevent the potential of error and abuse, the law requires the person who 
receives MAID to express their consent immediately prior to the physician or 
nurse practitioner administering or prescribing the lethal substance. Te problem 
with implementing an advance request for MAID is that it blurs the line between 
self-initiated death and death imposed by another. Te idea is that the patient 
expresses their autonomy through the agency of the MAID provider acting in the 
future. Te passage of time, change of circumstances, and limitations to what the 
patient can know or predict at the moment of their request can complicate the 
ways in which the provider merely acts as an instrument of the patient’s present 
freely expressed informed consent to MAID. Questions that arise already for 
SDMs, health care providers, and adjudicative bodies responsible for making 
treatment decisions on behalf of incompetent patients adopt a diferent character 
when the power to give that patient MAID on the strength of their advance 
123. Bill C-14, supra note 6, s 241.2(1)(d). 










request is legally recognised. At law, the patient’s informed consent is crucial to 
the provision of MAID in a way that sets it apart from other end-of-life decisions 
resulting in a patient’s death. Tere are already circumstances where medical 
decisions leading to a person’s death are made on a person’s behalf, absent any 
advance request. Barring evidence of a patient’s previously expressed wishes, 
evaluations of the patient’s best interests serve transparently as the reference 
point for determining whether eforts will be made to keep them alive. Te more 
the contemporaneous consent requirement is diminished, the more that MAID 
will appear to be just another mode of clinical intervention, like turning of a 
ventilator, and the more appropriate it will feel to predicate the delivery of MAID 
on the range of considerations, beyond mere evidence of an advance directive, 
that currently inform end-of-life decisions on behalf of persons lacking capacity. 
A further complication lies in the range of circumstances in which patients 
are eligible for MAID; for example, outside Québec,124 one need not be at the 
end of one’s life to receive MAID in Canada. Québec’s “end-of-life” criterion 
is not the same as the Criminal Code’s requirement that “natural death has 
become reasonably foreseeable.” In striking down the two provisions, the Québec 
Superior Court in Truchon treated them as if they were the same, but MAID 
assessors determine eligibility more restrictively in Quebec—subject as they are 
to an additional provincial statutory regime—than they do in the rest of Canada. 
Clinical guidelines of the Canadian Association of MAID Providers,125 scholarly 
studies of the MAID law,126 the Ontario Court of Justice’s decision in AB,127 
and empirical research128 reveal that the requirement in the Criminal Code and 
the one in Québec’s Act Respecting End-of-life Care are not equivalent. Tis owes 
in part to the ambiguity of the phrase, “natural death has become reasonably 
foreseeable,” and the absence of oversight bodies like Québec’s Commission 
124. See Act Respecting End-of-Life Care, CQLR c S-32.0001. 
125. Canadian Association of MAID Assessors and Providers, Clinical Practice Guideline: Te 
Clinical Interpretation of “Reasonably Foreseeable” (CAMAP, June 2017). 
126. Jocelyn Downie & Kate Scallion, “Foreseeably Unclear: Te Meaning of the ‘Reasonably 
Foreseeable’ Criterion for Access to Medical Assistance in Dying in Canada” 
(2018) 41 Dal LJ 23. 
127. AB v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 ONSC 3759. 
128. Tomas McMorrow et al, “Interpreting the Medical Assistance in Dying Law: Te 
Experiences of Physicians and Nurse Practitioners” (2020) 14 McGill JL & Health 51. Tis 
article reports fndings from interviews with twenty-four MAID providers and assessors from 
across the country, including eight in Québec, that reveal that while patients in Québec may 
be deemed eligible with a prognosis of up to twelve months, a patient outside the province 
may nevertheless satisfy the reasonably foreseeable natural death requirement if their manner 
of death is predictable but it is still not expected to happen for ten, or even ffteen years. 
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on End-of-life Care in the other provinces and territories. Te fact Julia Lamb 
ended up being assessed as eligible makes it highly probable that the plaintifs 
in Truchon would have qualifed for MAID, satisfying the clinical standard of 
interpretation of the “natural death has become reasonably foreseeable” as applied 
in practice outside Québec.129 Notably, while declaring these provisions invalid 
and suspending the declaration of invalidity for six months, Madam Justice 
Baudouin nonetheless stated: 
It is clear from the legislative regime in place that a patient’s capacity to consent to 
medical assistance in dying is a sine qua non condition to its administration. Te 
person making the request must be able to consent thereto in a free and informed 
manner, in addition to satisfying the other requirements.130 
Following advance directives presents an important but nonetheless imperfect 
way to honour a person’s autonomy and respect the principle of informed 
consent. Te image of the SDM serving as an extension of the patient’s agency 
is necessary to maintain respect for autonomy while keeping up the pretense 
that autonomy is something all human beings are able to exercise to the same 
extent at all times in their lives. Allocating the authority to an SDM or the 
instructions in a legal document to determine when one’s life will be ended by 
a MAID provider would alter the circumstances in which clinicians provide 
MAID, further erode the criminal prohibition on intentional killing, and expand 
the reliance on advance directives, SDMs, and authoritative bodies tasked with 
determining the best interests of incapacitated patients, in order to maximize the 
power of competent patients to determine when they die after losing capacity. 
When a patient lacks capacity, it becomes incumbent on others to exercise 
this decision-making authority on their behalf. Tere is a value in honouring 
previously expressed wishes. How much weight it should be accorded depends on 
other factors, including the need to respect a person in their current condition.131 
129. Ibid. 
130. Truchon, supra note 107 at para 254. Justin Trudeau made the announcement during 
the French-language leaders’ debate during the federal election campaign, after the 
Québec government had announced its decision not to appeal Truchon. Christopher 
Reynolds, “Trudeau says he would look at ways to improve medical assistance in dying 
law,” (3 October 2019), online: National Post <nationalpost.com/pmn/news-pmn/ 
canada-news-pmn/trudeau-defends-use-of-two-planes-calls-tory-criticism-a-far-right-tactic>. 
131. Bentley BCCA, supra note 43. 









IV. ADVANCE REQUESTS FOR MAID 
Tus, while the principle of informed consent may appear like the germ of legal 
growth in end-of-life decision-making in Canada, it also seems to constrain the 
extension of access to medical assistance in terminating life on compassionate 
grounds. General distrust and specifc difculties attending advance directives 
(both instruction-giving and proxy-appointing facets) as a means of realizing the 
principle of informed consent become especially acute in the context of MAID. 
Indeed, as Gina Bravo et al observe, when it comes to the question of making 
it legal to comply with advance directives requesting MAID—especially in the 
case of patients rendered incompetent by advanced dementia—arguments centre 
on the failure of advance directives to refect patient wishes when patients never 
communicate them sufciently clearly in the frst place, when patients articulate 
threshold conditions that are difcult for family members or physicians to assess, 
when such wishes may change, or previously expressed preferences appear in 
confict with what a patient appears to accept now.132 Indeed, such conficts raise 
the question of whether “a request made by a previously competent person should 
have any authority over the life of a person who now has severe dementia.”133 
A patient’s previous competence (or precedent autonomy) may certainly 
confict with their present autonomy.134 Not only may a person’s considered wish 
to die vanish with the loss of competence, but a person who dreaded the thought 
of living in dementia may nevertheless end up enjoying life in (at least the earlier 
stages of ) dementia. Tus, Paul Menzel and Bonnie Steinbock argue: 
It is one thing for someone to write an AD [advance directive] directing their 
treatment in case of permanent unconsciousness; the AD has full authority because 
later there is no current active agent. It is quite diferent to write an AD to apply 
in case of dementia, when there will still be a valuer, though one with diferent 
interests.135 
132. Gina Bravo et al, “Should Medical Assistance in Dying Be Extended to Incompetent Patients 
With Dementia? Research Protocol of a Survey Among Four Groups of Stakeholders From 
Quebec, Canada” (2017) 6 JMIR Res Protoc 208. 
133. Ibid. 
134. Paul T Menzel & Bonnie Steinbock, “Advance Directives, Dementia, and Physician-Assisted 
Death” (2013) 41 JL Med & Ethics 484 at 490. See Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: 
An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom (Alfred A Knopf, 1993). 
Cf Agnieszka Jaworska, “Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer’s Patients and the 
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Subsequent Consent” (2004) 7 Ethical Teory & Moral Practice 267. 
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After the SCC handed down its decision in Carter, but before the government 
tabled Bill C-14, a non-partisan expert advisory group and a special joint 
parliamentary committee both recommended legalising advance requests for 
MAID. Te Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group on Physician-Assisted 
Dying concluded in 2015 that requiring patients with degenerative diseases to be 
“competent at the time physician-assisted dying is delivered would force many 
of them to trigger the act earlier in the course of their disease than necessary.” 136 
Likewise, the 2016 Special Joint Parliamentary Committee expressed concern “that 
by excluding individuals who want access to MAID but have lost competence, 
such individuals will be left to sufer or end their lives prematurely.”137 In the 
Committee’s view, “[t]his situation was exactly what the Carter decision sought to 
avoid. Allowing advance requests also provides comfort to individuals, reducing 
their psychological sufering, knowing that their lives will not end in a way that is 
against their wishes.”138 It recommended limiting the option of advance directives 
to individuals who already have a diagnosis to ensure the request would be more 
informed. Te Committee also alluded to additional safeguards, including the 
possibility of requiring “health care practitioners to communicate regularly with 
their patients while they are still competent to ensure that their advance requests 
continue to refect their wishes.”139 It stopped short of further elaboration on 
these measures. 
But the specifcs matter. Minor diferences in the legislative scheme have 
the potential to yield signifcant consequences. If contemporaneous consent 
is no longer required in every case, then the conditions under which advance 
consent for MAID is valid must be defned. If consenting in advance to MAID 
is not going to be binding in every situation, who it is that has the authority 
to make that determination—and on what basis—must be established clearly. 
In November 2019, the interdisciplinary expert group commissioned by Quebec’s 
Ministry of Health and Social Services published a report and set of fourteen 
recommendations titled, L’aide médicale à mourir pour les personnes en situation 
d’inaptitude: le juste équilibre entre le droit à  l’autodétermination, la compassion 
et la prudence.140 Teir position is that barring advance requests does not strike 
136. See Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group on Physician-Assisted Dying, Final Report
(November 2015) (Co-Chairs: Jennifer Gibson and Maureen Taylor) at 31 [Final Report]. 
137. House of Commons, Medical Assistance in Dying: A Patient-Centred Approach, Report of the 
Special Joint Committee on Physician-Assisted Dying (February 2016) (Joint Chairs: Kelvin 
Kenneth Ogilvie and Robert Oliphant) at 24. 
138. Ibid. 
139. Ibid. 
140. Québec Report, supra note 9. 












the right balance between the values of self-determination, compassion, and 
prudence.141 Te authors maintain that respecting the right to self-determination 
demands permitting advance requests for MAID.142 Enabling a person to consent 
to receive MAID in the future—when they will no longer be competent to request 
it—extends that individual’s capacity to exercise autonomy.143 Nevertheless, the 
authors acknowledge that the requirement of contemporaneous consent controls 
for a range of risks that advance consent does not. Consequently, the authors 
endorse the legalization of advance requests rather than directives, meaning they 
would not be equipped with executory force, binding health care professionals to 
provide the patient with MAID.144 Te report also recommends excluding SDMs 
from initiating a MAID request on a patient’s behalf.145 In addition, it would 
limit eligibility to those patients who have already received a specifc diagnosis 
and satisfed all of the eligibility requirements. In Québec, that means the patient 
must be at the end of their life.146 Tus, while making some allowance for MAID 
via advance request, the Québec expert group’s proposal still restricts a range 
of people who may feel just as deserving. Simultaneously, the proposal shifts 
responsibility for determining who is entitled to receive MAID on the strength 
of an advance request onto the shoulders of physicians. 
Te need to make some allowance for people to access MAID after they 
have lost capacity stems from a sense of duty to facilitate the self-determination 
of individuals for whom avoiding the kind of death they do not want is felt to be 
integral to their life project.147 According to Menzel and Steinbock, demonstrating 
compassion and respect for people with dementia who communicated, before 
they lost capacity, that once their condition reaches a certain point they want 
to have their lives ended through MAID, may demand complying with their 
request. Tey note: 
Te desire to die to avoid sustained dementia…need not stem from ignorance and 
prejudice, lack of imagination, failure to appreciate adaptation, and fear of poor 
nursing home care…[I]t can be based on profound convictions about the meaning 
and narrative of one’s life…What makes survival into severe dementia to many so 
141. Ibid at 65. 
142. Ibid at 4. 
143. Ibid. 
144. Ibid. 
145. Ibid at 127. Although the report profers the idea of the patient designating a third party in 
their advance request whose role would be to remind the care givers about the request for 
MAID and to give it due consideration. Ibid at 117. 
146. Ibid at 124. 
147. Ibid at 102-04. See also Davis, “Alzheimer”, supra note 8. 
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valueless, and to some even horrifying, is the thought that…they will no longer be 
themselves, and yet others will have to relate to them.148 
To defect what they call the “disability critique,” Menzel and Steinbock attempt 
to distinguish patients whose incompetence stems from their experience of 
dementia from other individuals who lack legal capacity due to a cognitive 
disability.149 Menzel and Steinbock assert that whereas other people with profound 
disabilities can be helped to lead meaningful lives, patients with dementia cannot, 
since “[t]hey do not hold jobs, engage in volunteer activities, or socialize with 
family and friends.”150 While Menzel and Steinbock may certainly say what they 
themselves would consider a meaningless existence, what constitutes a meaningful 
or meaningless life varies from person to person. In fact, it is really the prospect
of experiencing cognitive decline that renders life with dementia meaningless for 
the person imagining it. A person may experience the life they had imagined as 
unlivable quite diferently when they are actually living it. Menzel and Steinbock 
are on more solid ground when they stress how strongly some individuals desire 
to determine their own life course right up to the end. Suggesting that life with 
degenerative neurocognitive impairment is pointless ignores what medical 
anthropologist Janelle S. Taylor describes as the ways in which ordinary people in 
everyday life are “experimenting with how to best continue to connect and to live 
together as fully and well as possible in the presence of dementia.”151 For Taylor, 
“personhood is not a property of individuals alone, but rather is a collective 
accomplishment, created in and through relationships as these are lived out in 
everyday life.”152 Te question of whether to permit advance requests for MAID 
depends in part on how best to reconcile competing conceptions—as well as past 
and present experiences—of personhood. 
Even though Menzel and Steinbock see advance requests for MAID as 
morally justifable, they argue that “the question of whether people should be 
148. Menzel & Steinbock, supra note 134 at 487, 493. 
149. An important consideration is that allowing advance requests for MAID makes it impossible 
for people who have lost legal capacity but retain what is referred to in the literature as 
“experiential interests,” to withdraw their consent to have their life ended. In this way, the 
possibility that a person’s “disability may be the condition that sustains the move into a 
very diferent form of afrmative becoming” is foreclosed. Margrit Shildrick, “Deciding on 
Death: Conventions and Contestations in the Context of Disability” (2008) 5 J Bioethical 
Inquiry 209 at 218. 
150. Menzel & Steinbock, supra note 134 at 488. 
151. Janelle S Taylor, “Engaging with Dementia: Moral Experiments in Art and Friendship” 
(2017) 41 Culture Medicine Psychiatry 284 at 286. 
152. Ibid at 285-86. 







able to create AEDs [advance euthanasia directives] to avoid prolonged life in 
dementia does not have a simple yes-or-no answer but depends on the details 
of cases.”153 Complying with an advance request means evaluating the quality 
of the prior directive as well as the individual’s current quality of life. Indeed, 
for Menzel, it is not only in situations of “unbearable sufering, but when the 
experiential value of survival is so minimal that it is outweighed by the strong 
critical interests refected in a clear and persistent AED” that advance requests for 
MAID should be implemented.154 
If a prior competent wish (or failing that, an SDM’s interpretation of what 
is in the patient’s best interests) bears such weight at present when it comes to 
end-of-life decision-making, transposing advance requests for MAID onto the 
existing legal landscape would result in situations where such demands end up 
prevailing over the clinical objections of the patient’s physicians. It is signifcant 
that the law in the only jurisdictions to permit advance requests for MAID (the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Colombia) refects a higher degree of 
deference to medical professional authority than Canadian law does. Dutch law, 
for example, specifes a set of due care criteria that physicians must meet before 
they may provide a patient with euthanasia. Tese include being satisfed that: 
the patient’s request is voluntary and well considered; the patient’s sufering is 
unbearable, with no prospect of improvement; there is no reasonable alternative 
in the patient’s situation, after coming to this conclusion along with the 
patient.155 It is also noteworthy that the most persuasive arguments for legalizing 
MAID through advance requests acknowledge that context matters; whether and 
how to implement them depends on the circumstances as well as features of the 
directives themselves. 
Indeed, advance requests for MAID refect but also compound some of the 
ethical questions already raised by advance requests to withdraw or withhold 
life-sustaining treatment. Rebecca Dresser highlights the practical issues with 
advance directives and the problems that come with according them trump 
status.156 Louise Bernier and Catherine Régis’ study of the advance medical 
153. Menzel & Steinbock, supra note 134 at 485. 
154. Ibid at 494. 
155. Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act, s 2(1) cited in 
Regional Euthanasia Review Committees, “Annual Report 2015” (April 2016) online 
(pdf ): <www.euthanasiecommissie.nl/binaries/euthanasiecommissie/documenten/ 
jaarverslagen/2015/april/26/jaarverslag-2015/Jaarverslag2015ENG.pdf>. 
156. See Dresser, “Precommitment”, supra note 8 (arguing that relying exclusively on a patient’s 
prospective determinations for reaching end-of-life decisions on their behalf discounts the 
social and ethical complexity that characterize these kinds of situations). 
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directives regime in Québec shows how eforts to increase the use of advance 
directives have led to the adoption of a form-flling approach that magnifes 
several of the concerns Dresser highlights.157 Tere is always room for judgment. 
Whether the legal jurisdiction locates it with the SDM, the physician, the 
adjudicative tribunal, or the courts, deciding how to apply a person’s previous 
wishes in their present circumstances is never an automatic exercise, especially 
when it concerns whether that person’s life is to be terminated. 
Terefore, the question is what the default should be. Making access 
contingent on contemporaneous consent bans MAID through advance request. 
A permissive model would make advance requests for MAID lawful in the same 
manner as other death-hastening medical interventions or abstentions. A third 
approach would incorporate formal requirements, substantive requirements, 
or both, relating to how the request would have to be made and under which 
circumstances it could be applied. Te frst approach prohibits ending a person’s 
life when that person is resisting what is happening to them. It also forbids 
terminating the life of an individual who is no longer capable of understanding 
and supporting this action, even if they once expressed a sincere desire for 
it. Te rationale is that if people want to end their lives through MAID, the 
public is justifed in requiring them to do it while they are conscious and have 
capacity. Otherwise, people will have their lives ended at a time that others judge 
appropriate. Sometimes the diference may not seem consequential. A person 
who loses capacity after their MAID request has been accepted but is still 
awaiting the ten clear days before they are permitted, by C-14, to receive it, is in a 
unique situation. It is highly unlikely that a person in these circumstances would 
have an abrupt change of heart. Ending their lives after their loss of capacity or 
consciousness, as per their signed and approved request for MAID, would appear 
to honour their wishes. 
Still, if the patient who is awaiting their approved MAID request loses 
capacity but remains conscious, the act of terminating their life will be conditional 
on imputing an intentionality on their part that is no longer there. Of course, 
this move is made when withdrawing, withholding, or performing a medical 
intervention, which has the efect of hastening a patient’s death, in accordance 
with wishes the patient previously expressed but now lacks the present capacity 
to confrm them. Te diference here is that the health care practitioner is 
157. Louise Bernier & Catherine Régis, Improving Advance Medical Directives: Lessons from Quebec
(Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2019). 









actively ending the person’s life;158 that is, hastening what is ultimately inevitable 
for all human beings but in an immediate fashion. It is technically an act of 
non-voluntary euthanasia. Technically because, in the circumstances where the 
MAID request has been approved and the patient has lost capacity while waiting 
for the procedure, the lack of contemporaneous consent here closely resembles the 
lack of contemporaneous consent given by an incapacitated patient to palliative 
sedation. By abolishing the “ten clear days” requirement, Bill C-7 renders the 
passage of time between MAID approval and provision indefnite. 
It has been claimed that a perverse efect of the “ten clear days” requirement 
is that, to ensure they can satisfy the capacity requirement, patients may forego 
high dosages of pain relief when they need it most. Tis is despite the fact that the 
law does permit the MAID provider to proceed if there is concern the patient will 
lose capacity before the ten days have elapsed. In Québec, where the “end-of-life” 
criterion is interpreted more stringently than the “natural death has become 
reasonably foreseeable” standard in the rest of the country, a greater proportion 
of patients have likely been near death, sufering from somatic pain, and in need 
of analgesics when deemed eligible for MAID.159 If palliative sedation relieves 
sufering, while the cessation of artifcial hydration and nutrition hastens a 
patient’s death, the question is why MAID should be added as a clinical tool 
in these kinds of scenarios. Te primary reason for barring a doctor or nurse 
practitioner from administering MAID in this type of situation is the concern 
that its erosion of the contemporaneous consent requirement for MAID could 
have negative ramifcations in other clinical contexts. Te law could be modifed 
to permit the provision of MAID to patients who have lost capacity during the 
ten-day waiting period, but not indefnitely. At present, there is no legal provision 
requiring a person who has been approved for MAID to renew that approval even 
if they do not go through with their decision to receive MAID for months, even 
years. Depending on the quality and clarity of the advance request, the kind of 
ethical quandary that non-voluntary euthanasia presents varies. Acknowledging 
158. As noted in the CCA report, another contrast (at least with withholding life-saving 
treatment) is that MAID involves bodily intrusion; absent consent, this may constitute the 
tort of battery or the criminal ofence of assault. Where consent is unclear, because the AR’s 
applicability is uncertain, or because the patient appears to resist, not performing MAID may 
be seen as erring on the side of non-intrusion. CCA, “Advance Requests”, supra note 2 at 38. 
159. See Act Respecting End-of-Life Care, supra note 124. With the Québec Minister of Health and 
Social Services Danielle McCann’s announcement that the end-of-life requirement will no 
longer apply, it remains to be seen what eligibility regime will follow the federal government’s 
consultations and planned modifcations to the MAID law before the suspension of the 
declaration. See Truchon, supra note 107. 
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that there may be circumstances where the previously expressed wishes of a 
patient to receive MAID should not always be given efect after they have lost 
capacity, the question is: What requirements would have to be established as 
a substitute for the current provision that patients must always give informed 
consent—and therefore have capacity—immediately prior to receiving MAID? 
One reason to retain the safeguard is that permitting MAID in one kind of 
case where the patient is not capable of consenting in that moment will make 
it harder to argue that contemporaneous consent has value in other contexts. 
It is surely more difcult to justify refusing MAID to people whose situations 
involve a slow, protracted and horrifc decline than it does for patients with 
days, months or even years of unconscious subsistence. If we deem it ethically 
acceptable, even legally required, to terminate someone’s life without their 
current (but with only their advance) consent, we cross a line that numerous 
other sets of circumstances may produce pressure to breach. Once it is lawful 
for someone to determine the moment of MAID provision on the patient’s 
behalf, it is much harder to justify denying MAID to other incompetent patients 
who did not make an advance request but who appear to be sufering or whose 
previous wishes appear to be known.160 Requiring a patient to communicate their 
informed consent right up to the end may appear to place inordinate weight on a 
pro forma eligibility criterion for accessing MAID. It will no doubt appear equally 
absurd, legalistic, and cruel when patients with advanced Alzheimer’s are denied 
what their loved ones feel would be a dignifed death merely on the basis that the 
patient never completed a formal request. 
Permitting MAID by advance request is about: alleviating a patient’s present 
anxiety at the prospect of losing capacity and having no choice but to experience 
what they view as an undignifed end; respecting the patient’s “precedent 
autonomy” by honouring the wishes they expressed when they had the capacity to 
form and articulate them; and relieving what the SDM interprets as the patient’s 
intolerable sufering (in light of explicit instructions or an understanding of that 
person’s values and preferences). Arguments in favour may presume any one of 
a variety of scenarios, ranging from a cancer patient on their death bed, refusing 
pain relief for fear of losing the lucidity they need to remain eligible to follow 
through on their decision to receive MAID, to a man horrifed by his spouse’s 
condition with dementia, knowing she never would have wanted to live like 
this and wanting to relieve her of this low quality of life. Tere are many more 
160. See R c Cadotte, 2019 QCCS 1987 (where the defendant was convicted of homicide for 
ending his partner’s life out of what he maintained—and which no one disputed—was 
compassion for his loved one’s sufering and respect for her wishes). 
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potential circumstances. Surely not all are the same. While it may be possible 
to modify the law to account for the more signifcant ways in which they difer, 
it is important to recognise that changing the law will have an impact on how we 
perceive, articulate, and address those diferences. 
Conversely, prohibiting MAID by advance request is about preventing 
patients whose previous instructions no longer refect their wishes from: having 
their lives ended; foreclosing the choice to spare others the burden of being one’s 
caregiver in the wake of a deteriorating cognitive condition; sheltering end-of-life 
decision making from the force of consequentialist reasoning; preventing SDMs 
and MAID providers from deciding to terminate a patient’s life based on an 
ascertainment of that person’s previously expressed wishes and interpretation of 
the person’s experience of the present circumstances (when that individual is not 
taking any steps to initiate their death themselves). 
Is it right to terminate someone’s life—even if, when they were still able, 
they expressed the wish to have this done for them—if they are not now seeking 
to end their lives themselves? One might argue that in some cases, it is—or at 
least, that the state is not justifed in interfering with individual choices about 
what is right and wrong. Whether one will die by MAID—or assist someone 
to die in this manner—is a personal decision, but the standards that society 
sets for lawful killing refect the public interest. When a person is no longer 
capable of deciding for him or herself whether he or she wishes to receive MAID, 
advance consent should not satisfy the demand for voluntariness that voluntary 
euthanasia requires. 
If the Dutch experience is any indication, cases of conscious patients 
receiving MAID in accordance with an AED may encounter SDM and physician 
ambivalence.161 Te case law and tribunal decisions relating to advance directives 
in Canada show the considerable grey area that can exist when it comes to applying 
a patient’s prior capable wishes. Furthermore, Ontario’s current statutory regime 
governing the application of advance directives contrary to clinical judgment 
sets the default in favour of SDMs getting the treatment for the patient that 
they deem is in their best interests. Absent the legal rules (such as the due care 
requirement) in the Netherlands, which appear to militate against a high rate of 
compliance with advance directives, current conditions in Canada (or, at least, 
Ontario) favour physicians granting advance requests for MAID, even where it 
goes against their clinical or ethical judgment. 
Te absolute ethical distinction between MAID and other forms of 
life-terminating conduct always depended on convention—a convention at once 
161. See CCA, “Advance Requests”, supra note 2. 
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reliant on, and responsible for, the criminal law on the matter. Tat convention 
no longer persists in the same manner, as the lawful practice of voluntary 
euthanasia and assisted suicide under prescribed circumstances indicates. 
Changes in the views of the public, the courts, health care professionals, and 
parliamentarians have produced a shift. Although the change is refected (and in 
no small part caused) by the amendments made to the Criminal Code, the law 
itself provides room for interpretation. Tis means that the norms governing 
access to MAID are in fux at the same time as wider societal expectations and 
values continue to change. 
It is possible for a person to issue advance directives that, once their cognitive 
state deteriorates to a certain point, they are to be deprived food and water no 
matter how hungry, thirsty, or receptive to eating and drinking they appear to 
be. Whether or how such directives will be followed through with is another 
question. In the case of Margot Bentley, tension lay between her family’s sense 
of obligation to respect their mother’s previously expressed wishes and her 
caregivers’ sense of duty to provide the necessaries of life to a person rendered 
completely dependent due to advanced Alzheimer’s disease.162 Of course, just 
as concerns about the prospect of legal liability may have infected Maplewood 
Seniors Care Society’s motives, the Bentley family may have been as motivated by 
compassion for their mother and distress at her condition as a sense of obligation 
to follow her advance instructions to a tee. Te principle of informed consent— 
and its approximations vis-à-vis advance directives and SDMs—does not only 
serve as a necessary bulwark against violations of personal autonomy and bodily 
integrity; it may also serve as a warrant for justifying difcult decisions ultimately 
predicated upon other considerations. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Canada, recognition of principles such as patient autonomy—and more 
specifcally—the right of competent, adult patients to refuse to consent to medical 
treatment (even if such refusal will result in their deaths) has not only justifed 
developments in the law facilitating advance directives; it has also played an 
important role in justifying the legalization of voluntary euthanasia and assisted 
suicide under specifc circumstances. Now, it also fgures in debates over current 
legal restrictions on these practices. Te question of who should be permitted to 
access MAID remains highly contested, especially in the case of advance requests 
162. Bentley BCCA, supra note 43. 




(where public opinion is more positive and the interests afected better resourced 
and more organized than in the case of the other two excluded groups: mature 
minors and individuals whose sole underlying condition is a mental disorder).163 
People fear the efects that dementia will have on them, their relationships to 
the people they care about, and the lives of those who will be obliged to care for 
them; understandably, to the extent they could, people would want to avoid the 
worst that a degenerative neurological condition can do. Rather than pre-empt 
the whole business and end one’s life now, it sounds quite reasonable to set out 
in advance under what circumstances one would no longer wish to live, and to 
have the person one trusts the most decide when those conditions have been met 
and consent to having the MAID provider follow through with one’s advance 
request. Te problem, though, is that an advance request has the potential to 
present difculties that a patient’s immediate expression of informed consent 
does not. Moreover, MAID is not just any medical treatment; it may sometimes 
difer in important respects from other forms of medical decision-making at the 
end-of-life, such as the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment 
and cessation of artifcial hydration and nutrition. 
A recent Dutch case brings these unique features into relief.164 Te case 
concerned an Alzheimer’s patient, Mrs. A., whose advance directives did not 
clearly indicate whether she herself was to be the one to determine when it was 
time to receive MAID or if that determination was to be made on her behalf 
based on an evaluation of her quality of life. David Miller, Rebecca Dresser and 
Scott Kim describe the circumstances leading up to Mrs. A’s death: 
While Mrs. A lived in the nursing home, things generally went well for her in the 
mornings. During the afternoons, however, she ‘exhibited signs of restlessness, and 
she appeared deeply unhappy’. Te case report states that Mrs. A ‘was continuously 
occupied with directing and instructing her fellow residents as though they were 
163. See Council of Canadian Academies, Te State of Knowledge on Medical Assistance in Dying 
Where a Mental Disorder is the Sole Underlying Medical Condition (CCA, 2018) [CCA, 
Mental Disorder]; Council of Canadian Academies, Te State of Knowledge on Medical 
Assistance in Dying for Mature Minors (CCA, 2018). But see Bill C-7, supra note 12 
(containing a provision, excluding mental illness as the qualifying medical condition for 
MAID eligibility, to expire two years after the legislation is passed). 
164. See “Physician permitted to grant a written request for euthanasia from individuals 
sufering from advanced dementia: summary” (24 April 2020), online (pdf ): Hoge Raad 
Der Nederlanden <www.hogeraad.nl/publish/pages/797/summary_conclusion_euthanasia_ 
case.pdf> [“Physician Granted Requests for Euthanasia”]. See David Gibbes Miller, Rebecca 
Dresser, & Scott YH Kim, “Advance Euthanasia Directives: a Controversial Case and Its 
Ethical Implications” (2019) 45 J Med Ethics 84 (providing a detailed summary of the 
facts in the case). 
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children’ (she had worked with children in the past). If the caregivers intervened in 
conficts between Mrs. A and other nursing home residents, Mrs. A sometimes ‘hit, 
kicked, scratched and bit’ the caregivers. She regularly told her caregivers that she 
wanted to die. But when she was asked whether she wanted to die, several times she 
answered, ‘But not just now, it’s not so bad yet!’ Mrs. A’s geriatrician thought that 
her inconsistent wishes refected a loss of insight into her illness. Mrs. A also ‘missed 
her husband and wandered around looking for him until late at night’. Mrs. A felt 
better during her husband’s daily visits, but she became ‘restless and sad’ when he 
left the nursing home. Based on these fndings, the geriatrician believed that Mrs. 
A was sufering unbearably for most of the day, and that euthanasia was appropriate 
given her advance directive.165 
From her physician’s perspective, Mrs. A’s lack of mental competence meant that 
whatever she said had no bearing on the decision to fulfll her advance euthanasia 
directive. Indeed, the physician indicated that she would have proceeded with 
the provision, even if, at the moment she was injecting Mrs. A with the needle, 
the patient had said, “I don’t want to die.” In fact, during the provision, Mrs. A’s 
family restrained her after she unexpectedly tried to get up. 
Te Dutch public prosecutor subsequently opened an investigation into 
Mrs. A’s death. Te Dutch Supreme Court ultimately afrmed the decision of 
the District Court that the physician had acted with due care and therefore was 
not liable to criminal prosecution. According to the Supreme Court’s reasons, 
a patient who can no longer express their will due to advanced dementia may 
receive euthanasia in accordance with an advance, written request. All legal 
requirements must be satisfed, including the physician’s obligation to act with 
due care and to “impart the substance in a way that does justice to the special 
nature of situations involving advance dementia.”166 If the patient’s conduct 
or verbal expression indicates that the present situation does not correspond 
with the circumstances envisaged in the directive, it may be a situation where 
the request cannot be granted but the court “must exercise reticence when 
assessing the physician’s medical actions.”167 Moreover, the Dutch Supreme 
Court points out that the physician providing MAID may wish to sedate the 
patient in advance to avoid the possibility of the patient engaging in irrational or 
unpredictable behaviour.168 
165. Miller, Dresser & Kim, supra note 164 at 85. 
166. “Physician Granted Requests for Euthanasia”, supra note 164. 
167. Ibid. 
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Te Canadian government’s Bill C-7 refects certain features of the law in 
the Netherlands.169 Bill C-7 allows patients to consent in advance to MAID— 
currently prohibited by the contemporaneous consent requirement—so long as 
their natural death has become “reasonably foreseeable.”170 Under the proposed 
legislation, eligible patients may receive MAID whether they continue to express 
a wish to die or not. Once approved, the only prerequisite is that they have 
scheduled a date for the provision with their provider. Te bill does not prescribe a 
time limit, so it is possible that the patient and provider could arrange a provision 
days, weeks, months, or even years in the future. 
Bill C-7 also does not indicate whether the use of sedatives or deception 
on the patient to help facilitate the procedure is permitted, but it does establish 
some limits. For example, the bill provides that “the medical practitioner or nurse 
practitioner may administer a substance to a person to cause their death…if the 
person does not demonstrate, by words, sounds or gestures, refusal to have the 
substance administered or resistance to its administration.”171 Te bill specifes 
that “involuntary words, sounds or gestures made in response to contact” do not 
count as refusal.172 Te bill does not say what the MAID provider must do if the 
patient does refuse or resist. Are they permitted to try again later that day or the 
next? Te bill notes that the substance will be “administered to the person in 
accordance with the terms of the arrangement” so perhaps that could include a 
contingency plan.173 At any rate, the statutory parameters remain under-specifed. 
Given the practical, as opposed to purely abstract problems and stressors 
patients would encounter, one may look to precedent to fnd workable ways 
to address potential conficts. Nowhere—not in Switzerland, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Colombia, or any U.S. state that has legalized physician 
assisted suicide—may a proxy decision-maker initiate a request for MAID on 
their own. When it comes to jurisdictions that do permit advance directives, 
the approaches difer markedly. Te Dutch allow physician compliance with 
advance directives only when patients who have lost capacity are still conscious, 
whereas in Belgium and Luxembourg, the law permits it only for patients who 
169. Bill C-7, supra note 12. Elements of this analysis of Bill C-7 are published in Tomas 
McMorrow, “Bill C-7 lacks adequate limits for advance MAiD requests” Policy Options
(11 November 2020), online: <policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/november-2020/ 
bill-c-7-lacks-adequate-limits-for-advance-maid-requests>. 
170. Bill C-14, supra note 6, s 241.2(2)(d). 
171. Bill C-7, supra note 12, cl 3.2(c). 
172. Ibid, cl 3.3. 
173. Ibid, cl 3.2(d). 












MCMORROW, THE WAXING & WANING OF INFORMED CONSENT 331 
are irreversibly unconscious (e.g., in a persistent vegetative state).174 Besides, 
as of October 2019, only eight cases in the Netherlands of patients registered 
as decisively incompetent receiving euthanasia based on advance directives have 
been reported.175 Two of these cases resulted in the responsible oversight body 
issuing a reproof of the physician’s actions. Furthermore, there is considerable 
evidence of physicians and SDMs not complying with advance directives. It turns 
out that “the very situations for which [advance directives] were developed (i.e., 
when patients can no longer communicate their wishes) are also the situations in 
which they are not being followed.”176 
How does one decide to put an end to another’s life when that person is 
no longer able to confrm or deny that this is what they want? Requiring a state 
of irreversible unconsciousness is preferable to requiring that the patient retain 
consciousness since it avoids having to make a determination, based on an 
incompetent patient’s conduct, as to whether that person ought to receive MAID. 
It is unconscionable to cause the death of patients who do not understand what 
is happening to them, or do not currently wish to receive MAID. If the lethal 
procedure would have to be abandoned if the patient were to resist, surely it 
would also have to be avoided if the patient could not appreciate to what they 
were assenting. On the other hand, Dutch lawmakers and medical professional 
regulators have reasoned that, since the primary rationale for euthanasia is to 
relieve sufering, where a person is no longer sufering due to an irreversible 
loss of consciousness, then euthanasia is not justifed. In all likelihood, were 
advance directives to be permitted, a great number of people who would expect 
174. See Jan L Bernheim & Kasper Raus, “Euthanasia embedded in palliative care. Responses to 
essentialistic criticisms of the Belgian model of integral end-of-life care” (2017) 43 J Medical 
Ethics 489. For a more critical perspective on the Belgian model, see Trudo Lemmens, 
Heesoo Kim & Elizabeth Kurz, “Why Canada’s Medical Assistance in Dying Legislation 
Should Be C(h)arter Compliant and What It May Help to Avoid” (2018) 11 McGill JL & 
Health S61 at S119-S148. See also Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot bevordering 
der Geneeskunst, Te role of the physician in the voluntary termination of life (KNMG, June 
2011); Paul Mevis et al, “Advance directives requesting euthanasia in the Netherlands: 
do they enable euthanasia for patients who lack mental capacity?” (2016) 4 J Medical 
L & Ethics 127. 
175. Regional Euthanasia Review Committees, “Annual Report 2018” (April 2019), online 
(pdf ): <www.euthanasiecommissie.nl/binaries/euthanasiecommissie/documenten/ 
jaarverslagen/2018/april/11/jaarverslag-2018/RTE_jv2018_English.pdf>. See also CCA,
“Advance Requests”, supra note 2 at 175 (indicating the total as six but not including the 
2018 RTE report). 
176. ME de Boer et al, “Advance directives for euthanasia in dementia: Do law-based 
Opportunities Lead to More Euthanasia?” (2010) 98 Health Pol’y 256 cited in CCA,
“Advance Requests”, supra note 2 at 123. 








to receive MAID would nevertheless fnd their hopes dashed due to the cautious, 
case-by-case approach that such an untested, risk-laden way of governing 
end-of-life decision-making would necessarily demand. 
Te loss of capacity has the potential to pose quite practical problems. 
Issues of principle are in play, certainly. Te tension is not, however, between 
abstract proposition and personal concern. Neither the value of autonomy nor 
the principle of informed consent can, of itself, ofer a solution since diferent 
ideas and applications of these concepts yield diferent results. Qualifying the 
distinction in Canadian criminal law between active and passive forms of medical 
aid in hastening death means more detailed and specifc justifcatory work is 
needed when defending restrictions on access to MAID. Since the law permits 
patients sufering from a grievous medical condition to receive medical assistance 
in dying—and for some time, advance requests have been a standard means 
to ensure patient treatment preferences are respected at the end of life—losing 
capacity appears tantamount to having “the right to a peaceful, dignifed death” 
taken away.177 With an aging population, and rates of neurodegenerative diseases 
on the rise, the demand for MAID through advance request is only going to grow. 
Te principle of informed consent plays a critical role in respect to the law 
governing both advance directives and MAID. It does not yield a clear, obvious 
answer to the question of whether to permit MAID through advance requests. 
In its 2018 report, Te State of Knowledge on Advance Requests for Medical Assistance 
in Dying, the expert working group of the Council of Canadian Academies (CCA) 
acknowledged that individuals facing the prospect of neurodegenerative decline 
may want to receive medical assistance in dying before experiencing the full extent 
of their illness in order to spare their families the considerable strain it brings: “It 
is fnancially, emotionally, and physically challenging to provide round-the-clock 
care and it is reasonable to want to avoid burdening loved ones with years of 
caring for someone with severe dementia.” 178 Indeed, given the choice, many 
parents, grandparents, spouses, and friends may feel like they should spare their 
loved ones by opting for an assisted death. In this way, permitting MAID through 
advance request would not just allow individuals to exercise their autonomy in 
ways heretofore constrained under pain of state sanction; it also shifts societal 
expectations, clearing the way for a sense of personal obligation to act in a way 
that the criminal law had previously foreclosed. As a consequence—the CCA 
working group report notes—“[t]here is concern…that [advance requests] for 
MAID…could become a release valve for the societal failure to provide adequate 
177. CCA, “Advance Requests”, supra note 2 at 138. 
178. Ibid at 146. 
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support or care for those with neurocognitive declines and their families.”179 
MAID thereby becomes the answer to complicated problems society is failing to 
face head on. Te tenor of such arguments is nothing new to those familiar with 
debates over euthanasia in general. 
Indeed, the Council of Canadian Academies’ working group report on 
eligibility for MAID solely on the basis of mental disorder acknowledges that the 
authors themselves disagree about when MAID is legitimate. Te report notes 
that some of the working group members contend that, even if an individual is 
seeking MAID due to a systemic lack of medical, social, or economic resources, for 
example, depriving them of the opportunity to decide the manner and timing of 
their death forces that person to bear the brunt of society’s failings and disrespects 
their agency.180 Applied to the present discussion, the argument would be that 
while eforts to de-stigmatize dementia, enhance fnancial and emotional supports 
for caregivers, and improve the quality of care for people with neurological 
conditions may reduce the level of demand for MAID through advance request, 
it does not justify restricting access until such changes are realized.181 Tat, say 
these expert working group members, is a form of paternalism that devalues the 
self-determination of people trying to “make do as best they can in an imperfect 
world.”182 In their view, the goal should be to ensure “maximal freedom for the 
self-determination of capable people within constrained circumstances, while 
179. Ibid. 
180. CCA, Mental Disorder, supra note 163 at 99. 
181. Tis echoes the opinion of the Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group on 
Physician-Assisted Dying that “palliative care should not be seen as a pre-condition 
for the development of a system that permits physician-assisted dying, but rather as a 
complement to improved end-of-life care.” See Final Report, supra note 136 at 20. Of course, 
introducing MAID, a one-of intervention with permanent consequences, as part of the 
suite of treatments for mental disorders, presents a greater rupture in established practice 
than in the palliative care context where the deliberate withholding and withdrawing of 
medical treatment already hastens death. But see Te Halifax Group, MAiD Legislation at a 
Crossroads: Persons with Mental Disorders as Teir Sole Underlying Medical Condition (Institute 
for Research on Public Policy, 2020), online: <on-irpp.org/2uGglD4>. Cf Expert Advisory 
Group on Medical Assistance in Dying, Canada at a Crossroads: Recommendations on Medical 
Assistance and Dying and Persons with a Mental Disorder- An Evidence-Based Critique of 
the Halifax Group IRPP Report (EAG, 2020), online: < www.eagmaid.org/report>. Also, 
it is noteworthy that throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, Parliament has not invested 
anywhere near the time and energy it has spent on expanding access to MAID, on enhancing 
access to mental health services or improving supports for patients living with dementia 
and their carers (whether in a home or institutional setting). Bill C-7 does not earmark any 
money for such initiatives either. 
182. CCA, Mental Disorder, supra note 163 at 99. 





also seeking to remedy unjustifed inequalities.”183 In the abstract, it is difcult 
to disagree with this proposition. In practice, the legislative challenge of striking 
such a balance is even more difcult than the adjudicative task that the CCB 
performs every time it must determine whether it is in a person’s best interests to 
be allowed to die while that patient’s loved ones adamantly insist that it is not. 
Establishing prospective rules with general applicability has broader repercussions 
than rendering a decision in an individual case. 
Maximizing freedom means setting safeguards that prevent patient 
autonomy from being disrespected. Although compliance with the informed 
consent principle may ofer an invaluable means of respecting this value—and the 
concept of advance consent an indispensable proxy—the MAID context presents 
unique challenges. Recognizing why the temptation is so strong to discount these 
diferences is important. It is precisely because removing the requirement for 
contemporaneous consent seems to be the answer to such vexing problems—the 
sufering of patients anticipating the horrors their condition will bring, the sheer 
wastefulness of so many wasting away when they would never have wanted such 
an end for themselves, the families fnancially and emotionally taxed to the brink, 
and the health care system stuck having to do more for more, for longer, with 
less—the temptation to allow advance requests for MAID appears overwhelming. 
Tat, in and of itself, ofers, if not reason to resist, then reason to pause, review 
relevant (and still largely forthcoming) research, and refect on the implications 
of untethering MAID access from contemporary informed consent. Tere will 
always be restrictions on accessing MAID by advance request, so long as respect 
for patient autonomy and the value of voluntariness retain primacy. Requesting 
to have one’s life ended at a point in the future, no matter the specifcity of the 
conditions identifed in the request, is more complicated and more vulnerable 
to error and abuse than is giving contemporaneous consent. Removing the 
current consent requirement to permit advance requests for MAID demands 
its replacement with an alternative regulatory scheme. Some restrictions will 
apply, so invariably some people with very particular ideas of how they do (and 
more precisely, how they do not) want their lives to end, would end up with 
their autonomy interests thwarted. Repudiating the imperfect but nonetheless 
principled approach to determining lawful access to voluntary euthanasia would 
erode the system of safeguards in addition to infating and ultimately frustrating 
the expectations of many people who wish to have MAID provided for them 
when they are no longer able to request it themselves. 
183. Ibid. 
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Under Bill C-7, those who are eligible but not yet ready to die would then 
be able to receive MAID on a specifed date in the future. Advocates of the Bill 
C-7 MAID consent waiver argue these patients will thereby be spared the “cruel 
choice” of either ending their lives when they still have capacity or enduring the 
passage through advance dementia to death.184 And yet, there is an element of 
cruelty built into any law that makes the compassionate termination of one’s 
sufering hinge on flling out the requisite paperwork. Witnessing an apparently 
contented person receive MAID may make it hard to see why another patient, 
appearing to sufer more and expressing their wish to die, would not also be able 
to receive MAID. Evidence of a patient’s wishes or values both prior to, and after, 
losing capacity may seem just as sound a basis to provide them with an assisted 
death as a formally approved advance MAID request; but then we have drifted 
away entirely from respecting the principle of informed consent. Any statutory 
efort at distinguishing permissible versus impermissible forms of non-voluntary 
euthanasia will be rife with difculty—not least, one as under-specifed as Bill 
C-7. Te contemporaneous consent requirement ofers a clearer, more certain 
and predictable threshold of legality. 
Once it is lawful for others to decide when a patient in neurocognitive 
decline should have their life terminated through MAID, it becomes increasingly 
difcult to justify restricting this practice in any way that sets it apart from 
decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment. But no one suggests 
that these established forms of end-of-life decision-making might require 
concealing from the patient what is happening to them. Te fact that sedation 
may be considered necessary before providing conscious patients with MAID 
via advance requests—and, as the Dutch Supreme Court suggests, even part of 
the standard of care—places the informed consent principle under signifcant 
strain. To the extent that the principle of informed consent may serve as a 
normative bulwark against health care professionals interfering with a patient’s 
bodily integrity, its value as a safeguard diminishes once a person lacks the legal 
capacity to give or refuse consent. Permitting the provision of MAID on the basis 
of advance consent reduces the level of legal protection for the lives of people 
lacking legal capacity, including those experiencing dementia. 
Te ethics of how we treat people who have lost capacity due to neurocognitive 
deterioration demands seeing them not simply as shadows of their former selves, 
184. Jocelyn Downie, “Medical assistance in dying bill an important step 
forward for Canadians with dementia” Policy Options (27 October 
2020), online: <policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/october-2020/ 
medical-assistance-in-dying-bill-an-important-step-forward-for-canadians-with-dementia>. 
(2021) 58 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL336 
but also as individuals with the spark of life; that is, as persons owed due regard. 
Granting to a person the assisted death that they previously expressed to be 
their due must be balanced against the public interest in prohibiting the act 
of terminating someone’s life on their behalf. Te alternative is to develop an 
ethics of life termination—as to whose moral, political, economic, and cultural 
ramifcations one may speculate with curiosity, optimism, or dread. 
